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SEX DISCRIMINATION IN THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION:  HISTORICAL AND 
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES 
Audrey Wolfson Latourette* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The legal and cultural barriers that confronted nineteenth century 
American women with respect to obtaining entrance to the legal 
profession were onerous.  In an era in which religious mandates and 
cultural norms proscribed any role for women other than the proper 
sphere of mother and wife, and legal obstacles to owning property, 
voting, and keeping one’s wages existed, the notion that a woman would 
depart from the sanctity of the home and enter the combative and 
powerful legal profession was viewed as anathema.  The male bastion of 
jurisprudence overwhelmingly rejected the idea that the weaker, 
submissive sex could successfully undertake legal training and 
competently engage in advocacy in a public arena.  While avocations 
such as teaching, nursing, and even medicine garnered some support as 
an extension of a woman’s allegedly inherent nurturing qualities, the 
law, termed as “hard, unpoetic and relentless”1 by nineteenth century 
attorney Clara Foltz, served as the antithesis of the acceptable feminine 
endeavor.  Would be Portias, therefore, were generally excluded from 
law schools and found the alternate route to becoming lawyers, i.e., 
apprenticeships, difficult to obtain as well.  Even when women 
successfully passed the bar exam, courts refused to grant them licenses 
and admit them to the profession.  Women such as Lavinia Goodell, 
Belva Lockwood, and Clara Foltz exhibited extraordinary drive, tenacity, 
and wit as they engaged in a variety of legislative and litigation 
strategies designed to gain entry into the profession of law, despite being 
advised that such behavior was unseemly, even shocking, and unfit for 
the female character.  Myra Bradwell, the esteemed editor of the Chicago 
Legal News, suffered an onslaught of legal rationales as to why she would 
be denied permission to practice law in Illinois:  She was a married 
woman, and thus, deemed incompetent to contract.  She was a woman 
                                                 
*  Professor of Law, Richard Stockton College of New Jersey.  This research was 
conducted as a Scholar-in-Residence appointed by the Faculty Resource Network at New 
York University.  An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Oxford Round Table 
Conference on Women’s Leadership at the University of Oxford.  This Article also received 
the Best Paper Award of 2005 from the North East Academy of Legal Studies in Business at 
its annual conference April 15-April 17, 2005, at Lake George, New York. 
1 KAREN BERGER MORELLO, THE INVISIBLE BAR: THE WOMAN LAWYER IN AMERICA 1638-
1986, at 65 (1986). 
Latourette: Sex Discrimination in the Legal Profession:  Historical and Conte
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2005
860 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39 
for whom any civic duty and public performance was beyond the pale.  
Finally, in the inimitable language of United States Supreme Court 
Justice Bradley, her “natural and proper timidity and delicacy” rendered 
her unfit to pursue the profession.2 
While some assert that the significant numbers of women in law 
school and in the profession commencing in the 1970s suggests that 
equality in the profession has been attained, a review of contemporary 
studies addressing sex discrimination in law and of recent litigation 
suggests otherwise.  While unquestionably the sheer numbers of women 
attorneys in the courtroom, the classroom, and the boardroom exert a 
significant presence, gender bias in the profession persists.  Cases 
encompassing sexual harassment claims, such as that evidenced in 
Barbara Denny’s lawsuit against Judge Edward J. Seaman, formerly of 
the New Jersey Superior Court, indicate that vestiges of gender 
stereotypes continue to deter women’s ascent in the legal profession.3  
Issues of sex discrimination arise with respect to partnership decisions, 
such as that asserted in Nancy Ezold’s lawsuit against the Philadelphia 
firm of Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen.4  A recently growing trend of 
gender bias litigation addresses the glass ceiling that continues to 
pervade the profession and the law firms’ failure to afford equality with 
respect to attaining partnership, comparable compensation with that of 
male colleagues, and management positions within the firms.  At the 
same time, contemporary women attorneys face the ageless dilemma of 
balancing professional commitment and responsibilities with the 
demands of family life.  It is noteworthy that while the rigid nineteenth 
century doctrine of separate spheres is no longer espoused as the desired 
norm in society, remnants of it remain as both men and women express 
stereotypical thinking with regard to assumption of family 
responsibilities.  Just as their forbearers served as leaders in the effort to 
surmount the ridicule and contempt afforded any “hysterical” and 
“sexless” woman who dared to aspire to enter into the legal profession, 
so, too, are contemporary female attorneys acting as trailblazers to secure 
gender equality for women, in terms of compensation and partnership, 
and to ultimately transform the profession into one that departs from its 
male profile and comports with the realities of both women and men 
                                                 
2 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873). 
3 In re J. Seaman, 627 A.2d 106 (N.J. 1993).  Also note on July 6, 2004, the Senate 
confirmed the appointment to a federal judgeship of J. Leon Holmes, an Arkansas lawyer 
who has written publicly that women should be subordinate to their husbands.  See 
Sumana Chatterjee, Split Senate Approves Ark. Lawyer for Federal Judgeship, PHILA. INQUIRER, 
July 7, 2004, at A5. 
4 Ezold v. Wolf, 983 F.2d 509 (3d Cir. 1992). 
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who seek balance in their personal and professional lives.  Those 
espousing what is sometimes deemed a feminization of the culture of the 
profession today confront, however, more than the entrenched vestiges 
of male ideologies or patriarchal attitudes.  They must also contend with 
the current substantial economic and competitive constraints within 
which law firms must operate, including the extraordinary growth in the 
number of attorneys and its concomitant impact upon the profession.  
Thus, it is both cultural ideologies and economic realities that pose 
serious impediments to the attainment of any genuine transformation of 
the legal profession. 
II.  NINETEENTH CENTURY CULTURAL NORMS 
The cultural context within which nineteenth century women lived 
provided the necessary justification to oppose the entry of women into 
law, premised solely on their gender.  In a manner somewhat predictive 
of the emphasis on the rigidly demarcated roles of the nuclear family 
prompted by President Truman’s containment policies regarding Cold 
War threats,5 the home was viewed as the bulwark against the enormous 
economic and political changes wrought by the nineteenth century.6  In 
this era the doctrine of separate spheres divided the world into public 
and private sectors, affording men and women distinct gender related 
roles.  His “greatness and power” could be exhibited abroad among the 
public; her “exalted” sphere encompassed only the domestic duties of 
the home.7  This cult of domesticity or the cult of true womanhood, as 
the movement was known, regarded women as morally superior beings 
whose social role mandated confinement to domestic duties, less they be 
contaminated by the realities of the brutal marketplace.  Moreover, the 
law had established the framework within which women’s rights could 
be constrained and separate spheres could be enforced.  Cultural 
perceptions were reinforced by the applicable law of coverture, or the 
legal principle of marital unity, which regarded the woman’s being as 
merged with that of her husband, subject to his authority and control.  
As embodied in Sir William Blackstone’s Commentaries, “the very being 
or legal existence of the woman is suspended during marriage.”8  
                                                 
5 ELAINE TYLER MAY, HOMEWARD BOUND: AMERICAN FAMILIES IN THE COLD WAR ERA 
(1999).  May notes that a traditional domestic ideology with rigid gender roles was 
endorsed by the cold war generation, whose own parents ironically had challenged the 
sexual standards of the day.  Id. at xvii, 22. 
6 From Colonial Times to the New Deal, WOMEN IN AMERICAN LAW 140 (Marlene Stein 
Wortman ed.) (1985). 
7 Id. at 53-54. 
8 Id. at 14, 27. 
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Pursuant to this doctrine, the husband provided protection from the 
harsh world in exchange for total dominion over her person and her 
assets, including her wages, her property, and her children.  The “civil 
death” or legal disability arising from coverture deprived a woman of 
the relative autonomy with respect to her resources that she as a single 
woman would have enjoyed.  The burdens of coverture were captured in 
a popular British rhyme: 
Thus although when you’re a spinster 
You your own affairs may rule 
Yet with vows pronounced at ‘Minster 
You’ve become a helpless fool.9 
Accepted theories regarding women’s limited intellectual capacity 
and physiological incapability fueled societal resistance to formal or 
professional education for women.  Dr. Charles Meigs, a noted professor 
at Jefferson Medical College in Philadelphia, provided support for the 
philosophy of true womanhood, asserting that women were naturally 
religious, pious, timid, modest and dependent.  Comparing woman with 
the robust masculinity of the Apollo of the Belvidere, he observed “she 
has a head almost too small for intellect, but just big enough for love.”10  
The “scientific facts” regarding Meigs’ small brain theory were further 
reinforced by medicine’s posture that women were physiologically 
incapable of undertaking rigorous study.  The popular 1873 Sex in 
Education by Dr. Edward H. Clarke espoused the firm belief that women 
could not function simultaneously in both an intellectual and 
reproductive manner.  Clarke asserted that excessive study diverted vital 
bodily fluids from the uterus to the brain and arrested development of 
the “reproductive apparatus,” causing mental strain for women and 
serious health consequences for both mother and child.11  A story written 
by a Connecticut attorney and printed in the nineteenth century law 
journal, The Green Bag, provided evidence that some individuals in the 
law profession had fully adopted the theories of Dr. Clarke.12  In the tale, 
an unmarried woman attorney suffered ill health as she endeavored to 
build a practice.  While skilled in drafting documents, her weak 
constitution was no match for her toughened competitors in court.  
Warned by a male colleague that she was overworking, she ultimately 
fainted in court, and requested that she be taken away.  Diagnosed with 
                                                 
9 MORELLO, supra note 1, at 109 (quoting Women Lawyers Journal (July 1928)). 
10 IMAGES OF WOMEN IN AMERICAN POPULAR CULTURE 10 (Angela G. Dorenkamp et al. 
eds., 1995) (quoting MEIGS, WOMAN, HER DISEASES AND REMEDIES (1859)). 
11 Id. at 16 (quoting CLARKE, SEX IN EDUCATION (1873)).  
12 Charles C. Moore, The Woman Lawyer, 26 THE GREEN BAG 525 (Dec. 1914).  
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brain fever, she relinquished her courtroom career, married a lawyer, 
and helped him with the office aspects of his practice.13  Thus, consistent 
with true womanhood precepts, the chastened female, out of the public 
eye, modestly and appropriately worked under the tutelage and 
protection of her spouse.   
A. Admission to the Bar in the Nineteenth Century 
Armed with the law of coverture and the civil death doctrine, 
together with the separate spheres doctrine and supportive medical 
theories, the legal profession through its courts was fully prepared to 
rebuff attempts by women to enter “a professional culture steeped in 
masculinity.”14  Arguments advanced by the courts in denying licenses 
to practice included the expected:  Such a role directly conflicts with the 
notion of womanhood expressed in the cult of true womanhood.  
Women’s health would be threatened, their delicate systems could not 
handle the type of degrading issues that arise in court, and they were not 
competent to engage in analytical thought.  Others urged that a jury 
would be unduly swayed by the feminine appeal of a woman attorney.  
Underlying much of the opposition was the fear that women’s entry into 
law would set the precedent for their obtaining the right to vote or 
fulfilling other civil offices. 
What motivated this small number of women to surmount 
seemingly impenetrable cultural and institutional barriers in order to 
obtain legal training and admission to the bar?  There were just five 
women lawyers in 1870 and seventy-five in 1880, in sharp contrast to the 
sixty-four thousand male lawyers.15  Just as the black civil rights 
movement of the 1960s engendered a striving for equality among 
women, so did the nineteenth century reform movements of abolition, 
temperance, and suffrage cause women “to see the limitations of their 
own existence, to apply emerging doctrines of human rights to their own 
situations, and to embark on self-conscious reformism in their own 
                                                 
13 Virginia G. Drachman, Women Lawyers and the Quest for Professional Identity in Late 
Nineteenth-Century America, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2414, 2438 (1990). 
14 Carol Sanger, Curriculum Vitae (Feminae): Biography and Early American Lawyers, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 1245, 1250 (1994) (reviewing JANE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICA’S FIRST WOMAN 
LAWYER: THE BIOGRAPHY OF MYRA BRADWELL (1993)). 
15 Barbara Allen Babock, Feminist Lawyers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1689, 1695 (1998) (reviewing 
VIRGINIA DRACHMAN, SISTERS IN LAW: WOMEN LAWYERS IN MODERN AMERICAN HISTORY 
253 (1998)). 
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interest.”16  Many of the nineteenth century women attorneys viewed 
admission to the bar and to the right to vote as inextricably intertwined.17  
Moreover, the restrictions imposed by coverture and the separate 
spheres philosophy, they felt, reduced women to a legal status related to 
that of slavery.  In 1848, the Seneca Falls Declaration, authored by 
Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Lucretia Mott, Martha C. Wright, Jane Hunt and 
Mary Ann McClintock, vividly expressed women’s discontent with the 
domestic sphere and deprivation of constitutional liberties.18  This 
infamous document, which reflected the birth of the feminist movement, 
contained two clauses specifically addressed to the practice of law.  In 
the list of injuries inflicted by man, it noted: 
He has monopolized nearly all the profitable 
employments, and from those she is permitted to follow, 
she receives but a scanty remuneration.  He closes 
against her all the avenues to wealth and distinction 
which he considers most honorable to himself.  As a 
teacher of theology, medicine, or law, she is not 
known.19 
Further, a resolution in the document asserts: 
Resolved, That the speedy success of our cause depends 
upon the zealous and untiring efforts of both men and 
women, for the overthrow of the monopoly of the pulpit, 
and for the securing to women an equal participation 
with men in the various trades, professions, and 
commerce.20 
                                                 
16 JoEllen Lind, Women Trailblazers: The Changing Role of Women in American Legal History, 
7 THE AMICUS 12 (Valparaiso University School of Law) (Winter 1994), available at 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/library. 
17 Babcock, Feminist Lawyers, supra note 15, at 1695.  Barbara Babcock views the 
nineteenth century attorneys as feminists at their core; Virginia Drachman, in contrast, 
portrays them as leaders of the more narrowly drawn women’s lawyers movement, 
separate and apart from the suffrage movement. 
18   Carolyn S. Bratt, The Sesquicentennial of the 1848 Seneca Falls Women’s Rights Convention:  
American Women’s Unfinished Quest for Legal, Economic, Political, and Social Equality:  
Introduction, 84 K. L. J. 715, 720, note 6, (Summer 1995/1996) (citing ELEANOR FLEXNER, 
CENTURY OF STRUGGLE 71-72 (1975)).  
19 Declaration of Sentiments, Seneca Falls Convention (1848) reprinted in IMAGES OF 
WOMEN, supra note 10, at 68-71. 
20 IMAGES OF WOMEN, supra note 10, at 71. 
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1. “Zealous and Untiring Efforts” of Myra Bradwell 
The extraordinary efforts of the nineteenth century trailblazers to 
defeat sex discrimination in the legal profession can be epitomized by 
those of Myra Bradwell, sometimes termed America’s first woman 
lawyer.21  In actuality, Arabella Mansfield was, in 1869, the first woman 
to be admitted to the practice of law in the United States.  After passing 
the Iowa state bar, Mansfield was fortunate to confront Justice Francis 
Springer who broadly interpreted the restrictive gender language in the 
Iowa admissions statute to not impliedly deny the right to female 
admission.22  The preeminence of Bradwell, who passed the Illinois bar 
with high honors several weeks after Mansfield, resulted from her role as 
publisher and editor in chief of the widely regarded Chicago Legal News, 
her advocacy of women’s rights issues and support of other women’s 
attempts to secure bar admission, and her litigation challenging the 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment privileges and immunities 
clause as inclusive of a woman’s right to practice law.  Her leadership 
was crucial to the subsequent efforts of women who sought to practice 
law in other states. 
In 1868, Bradwell, married to attorney James, initiated the Chicago 
Legal News, which became the most widely circulated law paper in the 
country.  Notably, Bradwell initially had to obtain a special charter that 
would permit her to run the business free of the normal disabilities 
attributable to the marriage state.23  Due to an arrangement she had 
negotiated with the Illinois legislature and courts, she was able to 
provide her readers timely access to recent legislative enactments and 
case law.  Not content with merely reporting the news, Bradwell used 
her paper as a vehicle to address sex discrimination in a variety of 
contexts, with significant emphasis on the efforts of women to gain entry 
to the bar.24  In 1869, Bradwell passed the Illinois bar exam and 
submitted her application to practice law accompanied by a brief which 
                                                 
21 JANE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICA’S FIRST WOMAN LAWYER: THE BIOGRAPHY OF MYRA 
BRADWELL (1993).  Friedman does note that Arabella Mansfield was, in fact, the first 
woman attorney.  Morello suggests that Margaret Brent in the seventeenth century, who 
served as the administrator of the Maryland Governor’s estate, and engaged in substantial 
litigation, was the first lawyer.  MORELLO, supra note 1, at 3.  The American Bar Association 
Commission on Women established the Margaret Brent Award in 1991 to recognize the 
achievements of women lawyers who have excelled in their discipline and paved the way 
for other women lawyers.  See American Bar Association Commission on Women in the 
Profession, available at http://www.abanet.org/women (last visited Oct. 20, 2004). 
22 MORELLO, supra note 1, at 12. 
23 FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 77. 
24 Id. at 12. 
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directly raised the issue of gender discrimination:  did being a woman 
disqualify her from obtaining a law license?25  The Illinois Supreme 
Court denied her application based on the disability imposed by 
Bradwell’s married state, which arose from the law of coverture.26  In 
short, a married woman deemed civilly dead could not, as an attorney, 
be bound by the contractual obligation that would exist between her and 
her client.  In response to her brief, citing an erosion of coverture through 
a variety of Married Women’s Property Acts and citing Mansfield’s 
admission to the Iowa bar, the court denied her application a second 
time, grounding the decision in the fact that her status as a woman was 
not designed to occupy the public sphere, which constituted a sufficient 
barrier to admittance to the practice of law, as inherited from the 
common law in England.27  Likening this “annihilation” of women’s 
political rights to the infamous Dred Scott28 decision, Bradwell then filed 
a writ of error to the United States Supreme Court, hoping to set a 
precedent that would afford other women a federal right to practice 
law.29  In the interim, Ada Kepley, a graduate of the University of 
Chicago Law, and Alta Hulett, who had trained for the law via an 
apprenticeship, were also denied admittance to the Illinois bar.  Bradwell 
joined their efforts to propose a revision to the Illinois statute, which 
eliminated gender as a basis for refusing admittance to the bar or any 
occupation or employment.  Under that statute, which was passed, 
Hulett in 1872 became the first woman attorney in Illinois admitted to 
practice.30 
It is with the United States Supreme Court case Bradwell v. State of 
Illinois 31 that Myra Bradwell’s groundbreaking reputation has primarily 
been intertwined.  In her appeal to the Court, Bradwell, via her attorney 
Matthew Carpenter, urged that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibited 
state interference with federal privileges and immunities, which 
included the right to admission to practice law in the courts of a state.  
The Court, consistent with the Slaughterhouse Cases32 decided one day 
earlier in which the Court denied a similar claim by those seeking to 
argue that a monopoly impeded their ability to engage in the butchering 
trade, held that practicing law also did not constitute a federal privilege.  
                                                 
25 Id. 
26 MORELLO, supra note 1, at 16. 
27 In re Bradwell, 55 Ill. 535 (1869). 
28 Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). 
29 MORELLO, supra note 1, at 18. 
30 Id. at 21. 
31 83 U.S. 130 (1873). 
32 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
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What is most damaging about the case is the concurring opinion of 
Justice Bradley (who had dissented in the Slaughterhouse Cases), which 
unequivocally delivered the Court’s view on women’s rights.  It is the 
matchless language regarding women’s “natural timidity and delicacy,” 
as enumerated by Justice Bradley, which provoked Bradwell’s scorn and 
eviscerated the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to women’s efforts to 
obtain equality in a variety of arenas, including the bar, for the next 
century:  
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always 
recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres 
and destinies of man and woman.  Man is, or should be, 
woman’s protector and defender.  The natural and 
proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the 
female sex evidently unfits it for many of the 
occupations of civil life.  The constitution of the family 
organization, which is founded in divine ordinance, as 
well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic 
sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain 
and functions of womanhood. . . .  It is true that many 
women are unmarried and not affected by any of the 
duties, complications, and incapacities arising out of the 
married state, but these are exceptions to the general 
rule.  The paramount destiny and mission of women are 
to fulfill the noble and benign offices of wife and mother.  
This is the law of the Creator.33 
Although the Court did not concur with Bradwell’s claim and failed 
to regard the right to practice law as a privilege and immunity 
encompassed by the Fourteenth Amendment, her case had a profound 
impact upon succeeding female advocates.  Bradwell raised the 
consciousness of women and inspired them to seek state legislative 
measures that would remove impediments to bar admission.  It is 
interesting to note that despite the new 1872 Illinois statute, which 
prohibited exclusions from professions premised on gender, and under 
which Bradwell could have sought admission to the bar, she chose not to 
use the statute; instead, she pursued her championship of women’s 
rights through her newspaper advocacy.  In 1890, as she approached 
                                                 
33 Bradwell, 83 U.S. at 141. 
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death, her spouse arranged for the Illinois Supreme Court to admit Myra 
to the bar on its own motion.34 
2. Lavinia Goodell Enjoys Her Blackstone 
A New Yorker who established a career in publishing, Goodell knew 
that her goal of being an attorney was not a likely one in the East, which 
was particularly resistant to the efforts of women to attend law school or 
apprentice with a firm.  Moving to Wisconsin in 1871 with her parents, 
Goodell established an apprenticeship with local attorneys and in 1874 
opened her own office and was admitted to practice on the circuit court 
level.35  As an unmarried woman, Goodell did not labor under the 
disability of coverture and sought admission to the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court.  Her arguments were essentially twofold in nature:  She urged a 
statutory construction, similar to that afforded Arabella Mansfield in 
Iowa, which argued that the word “he” in the Wisconsin admissions 
statute should be construed to include females.  Secondly, inasmuch as 
the legislature approved women attending the law department of the 
University of Wisconsin, she urged that they would approve such 
students practicing law upon graduation.36  The patriarchal fervor, with 
which Justice Edward Ryan articulated the court’s denial, made Justice 
Bradley’s ode to domesticity in Bradwell seem temperate in comparison: 
This is the first application for admission of a female to the bar of 
this court.  And it is just matter for congratulations that it is made in 
favor of a lady whose character raises no personal objection:  something 
perhaps not always to be looked for in women who forsake the ways of their 
sex for the ways of ours.37 
Urging that to follow the Iowa court’s analysis in the Mansfield case 
would “emasculate the constitution itself and include females in the 
constitutional right of male suffrage,”38 the court revealed its extremely 
strong antifeminist stance: 
The law of nature destines and qualifies the female sex for the 
bearing and nurture of the children of our race and for the custody of the 
homes of the world and their maintenance in love and honor.  And all 
                                                 
34 Sanger, supra note 14, at 1262. 
35 MORELLO, supra note 1, at 22. 
36 Id. at 23. 
37 In re Goodell, 39 Wis. 232, 240-41, 1875 Wisc. LEXIS 240, at 1, 14-15 (1875) (emphasis 
added). 
38 Id. at 242, 1875 Wisc. LEXIS 240, at 18. 
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life-long callings of women, inconsistent with these radical and sacred 
duties of their sex, as is the profession of the law, are departures from the 
order of nature; and when voluntary, treason against it.  The cruel 
chances of life sometimes baffle both sexes, and may leave women free 
from the peculiar duties of their sex.  These may need employment, and 
should be welcome to any not derogatory to their sex and its proprieties, 
or inconsistent with the good order of society.  But it is public policy to 
provide for the sex, not for its superfluous members; and not to tempt 
women from the proper duties of their sex by opening to them duties 
peculiar to ours.  There are many employments in life not unfit for 
female character.  The profession of law is surely not one of these. The 
peculiar qualities of womanhood, its gentle graces, its quick sensibility, 
its tender susceptibility, its purity, its delicacy, its emotional impulses, its 
subordination of hard reason to sympathetic feeling, are surely not 
qualifications for forensic strife.  Nature has tempered woman as little 
for the juridical conflicts of the court room, as for the physical conflicts of 
the battle field.39 
Two years later the Wisconsin legislature enacted an admissions 
statute patterned after the law Hulett and Bradwell had successfully 
lobbied for in Illinois, which barred sex discrimination.40  In 1889, 
Goodell was finally admitted to practice before the Supreme Court of 
Wisconsin, despite the protest of Justice Ryan in his dissent.  Sharing a 
partnership with a student at the University of Chicago, Goodell served 
as an effective advocate in several cases.41  While she successfully carved 
out a career in the male discipline of law, Goodell remained sensitive to 
the importance of displaying some conformity with the expectations of 
public propriety for a woman: 
The community looks at me a little doubtfully as not knowing what 
kind of woman I may be, but as [I] develop no other alarming 
eccentricity than a taste for legal studies, wear fashionable clothes, attend 
an orthodox church, have a class in the Sunday school, attend the 
benevolent society, and make cake and preserves like other women, I am 
tolerated.  Meantime, I enjoy my Blackstone and Kent even more than 
anticipated, only feel lonesome having no one to talk them over with.42 
                                                 
39 Id. at 245, 1875 Wisc. LEXIS 240, at 21-23. 
40 HEDDA GARZA, BARRED FROM THE BAR: A HISTORY OF WOMEN AND THE LEGAL 
PROFESSION 46 (1996). 
41 Id. 
42 Sanger, supra note 14, at 1266-67 (quoting Catherine B. Clearly, Lavinia Goodell, First 
Woman Lawyer in Wisconsin, 74 WIS. MAG. HIST. 243, 249 (1991)). 
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Notwithstanding Lavinia Goodell’s success and ready adaptation to 
the rigors of the law profession, her untimely death at age forty-one, 
allegedly from sciatic rheumatism, prompted a commentary whose 
author typified an adherent of the small brain, separate spheres 
philosophy.  The Chicago Journal queried whether the early death of 
Goodell suggested women are unable “to endure the hard usage and 
severe mental application incidental to a legal professional career,” 
which was quoted in an article by lawyer Lelia Robinson in The Green 
Bag.43  The Chicago Independent responded, “Miss Goodell was forty-one 
years of age.  Henry Armitt Brown, the noted young lawyer of 
Philadelphia, died recently at thirty-two.  We would like to suggest the 
query whether men are able to endure the hard usage, etc.  One swallow 
does not make a summer.”44 
3.  Belva Lockwood, the Indefatigable Warrior 
An attorney whose endurance for overcoming inordinate obstacles 
in attaining her goal of practicing in both state and federal courts, Belva 
Lockwood served as a role model for her peers.  The intransigency of the 
judicial system with respect to female attorneys compelled Lockwood to 
threaten, lobby, and litigate each step in order to gain full access to the 
profession.  Married with children, she initially sought acceptance at 
Georgetown University and Howard University, where she received 
denials.  In response to her application to Columbian College, now 
George Washington University Law School, the president informed her 
that the faculty found such an admission “would not be expedient as it 
would be likely to distract the attention of the young men.”45  In 1870, 
Lockwood was admitted to the newly formed National University Law 
School, whose male student body exhibited deeply held prejudice 
against the idea of female classmates.  At graduation, the men refused to 
share commencement ceremonies with the two women; the school 
dutifully excised the women’s names from the program, and withheld 
Lockwood’s diploma and that of the one other female, Lydia Hall.46  
Unable to obtain admission to the District of Columbia’s courts without a 
                                                 
43 Lelia J. Robinson, Women Lawyers in the United States, in 2 THE GREEN BAG 10 (1890), 
available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/library/wlhbp/articles/greenbagreal 
(alterations in original). 
44 Id. at 24. 
45 MORELLO, supra note 1, at 71. 
46 WORTMAN, supra note 6, at 260.  In her account of this episode, Lockwood noted that 
Lydia solaced herself by marrying a man named Grafan and leaving the city.  She wrote 
“[I] suppose she became ‘merged,’ as Blackstone says, in her husband.  I was not to be 
squelched so easily.”  Id. 
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law degree, Lockwood expressed her indignation in the following note 
to President Ulysses S. Grant, who also served as the law school’s 
president: 
Sir – 
You are, or you are not, President of the National 
University Law School.  If you are its president, I desire 
to say to you that I have passed through the curriculum 
of study at this school, and am entitled to and demand 
my diploma.  If you are not its president, then I ask that 
you take your name from its papers, and not hold out to 
the world to be what you are not. 
Very respectfully, 
Belva A. Lockwood47 
The diploma arrived shortly thereafter with no accompanying note, 
and Lockwood was duly admitted to the D.C. bar.  Her travails did not 
cease, as one of her cases required an appeal to the Court of Claims, an 
appellate court with its own admission requirements.  In her recounting 
of the admission hearing, Lockwood observed that after her male 
colleagues moved for her admission:  
There was a painful pause.  Every eye in the court-room 
was fixed first upon me, and then upon the court, when 
Justice Drake, in measured words, announced ‘Mistress 
Lockwood, you are a woman.’  For the first time in my 
life I began to realize that it was a crime to be a woman, 
but it was too late to put in a denial, and I at once 
pleaded guilty to the charge of the court.48   
Ultimately, the court ruled women were without legal capacity to 
serve as an attorney.  She next appealed to the United States Supreme 
Court, which refused to admit her to its court, premised on the belief that 
there was no English precedent for the admission of women.49  Myra 
Bradwell’s Chicago Legal News heartily denounced the decision, 
caustically urging that English precedent is not always so slavishly 
                                                 
47 MORELLO, supra note 1, at 72. 
48 WORTMAN, supra note 6, at 262. 
49 GARZA, supra note 40, at 44. 
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followed, as the Court does not compel the wearing of gowns and wigs 
deemed a requisite to practice in England.50 
Lockwood next engaged in a two-year pursuit to have federal 
legislation enacted to provide for the admission of women to the federal 
courts, while simultaneously maintaining a thriving law practice and 
supporting her family.  She drafted two bills, lobbied legislators, 
purposely garnered media attention, and obtained the support of two 
senators who strenuously advocated the admission of women to the bar.  
On February 7, 1879, the bill entitled “An Act to Relieve Certain Legal 
Disabilities of Women” was passed and signed into law by President 
Rutherford B. Hayes.  Lockwood subsequently was admitted to the 
Court of Claims, and she then became the first woman to appear before 
the Supreme Court of the United States.51  Her inexorable determination 
to fight the prejudice against women in the legal profession succeeded in 
opening the doors for all women to the federal courts. 
4. Clara Shortridge Foltz, the “Portia of the Pacific” 
To attain her dream of being a lawyer, Clara Foltz initially sought an 
apprenticeship with a well-known attorney; he responded that such a 
foolish undertaking would “invite nothing but ridicule if not 
contempt.”52  She eventually secured an apprenticeship with a willing 
male attorney.  Following the course charted by Bradwell, Goodell, and 
Lockwood in their legislative battles, Foltz lobbied for a Woman 
Lawyer’s Bill to remove gender as a qualification for the bar.  The 
legislatures in Illinois, Wisconsin, and the District of Columbia, among 
others, had deemed women attorneys less objectionable than did the 
courts.  In California, Foltz contended with opposition from supporters 
of the tenets of true womanhood.  Some argued women lawyers would 
be “unsexed,” would forsake domestic duties, or would wilt under the 
rigors of engaging in cross-examination.53  With five children and an 
absent spouse, however, a determined Foltz, with ally Laura De Force 
Gordon, secured its passage and was admitted to the bar in 1878, 
becoming the first female attorney in California. 
                                                 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 45. 
52 Barbara Allen Babcock, Clara Shortridge Foltz: First Woman, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1231, 
1245 (1994) (quoting Clara Shortridge Foltz, The Struggles and Triumphs of a Woman Lawyer, 
THE NEW AMERICAN WOMAN, June 1916). 
53 Id. at 1250-51. 
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Although a successful practitioner, Foltz sought the status and 
approval she would obtain were she to receive the imprimatur of a law 
school education.  During the same legislative session at which the 
gender neutral bar admission statute was passed, the legislature had 
created Hastings College of Law as part of the University of California 
system.  After receiving no response to her application, she and Laura 
Gordon descended upon Hastings and began taking classes.  Foltz later 
described the mature reaction of the “little fellows” in her class: 
The first day I had a bad cold and was forced to cough.  
To my astonishment every young man in the class was 
seized with a violent fit of coughing.  You would have 
thought the whooping cough was a raging epidemic. . . . 
If I turned over a leaf in my notebook every student in 
the class did likewise.  If I moved my chair—hitch went 
every chair in the room.  I don’t know what ever became 
of the members of that class.  They must have been an 
inferior lot, for certain it is, I have never seen nor heard 
tell of one of them from that day to this.54 
The founder of the law school, Judge Hastings, had expressed 
concern that the male students would be distracted by the women’s 
“rustling garments.”55  When the board of Hastings directed that the two 
women be removed, they commenced a lawsuit against Hastings, 
petitioning for a writ of mandamus compelling the law school to admit 
them.  Commentators suggest they reluctantly employed this alternative, 
inasmuch as they were well aware of the courts’ disinclination to favor 
women attorneys in the cases brought by Bradwell, Goodell, and 
Lockwood.56  Foltz’s arguments were three pronged:  (1) She satisfied the 
requirements for admission.  (2) The policies of Hastings as part of the 
California university system could not contradict that of the other 
departments which permitted female students.  (3) The same legislature 
that allowed females admission to the bar could not have intended their 
exclusion from its law schools.57  Hastings responded that it was 
privately founded and not subject to University of California regulations 
and that the laws of nature prohibited this enlargement of the women’s 
sphere.  Hastings also relied as precedent on the expansive opinion of 
Judge Ryan regarding a woman’s place, which he issued in the Lavinia 
                                                 
54 Id. at 1265. 
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Goodell case.58  Newspaper comments focused upon the physical 
appearance of the women as they argued their case in court, rather than 
their rhetorical ability, noting Clara Foltz had “profuse hair done in 
braids which fell backward from the crown on her head like an Alpine 
glacier lit by a setting sun.”59 
The trial court ruled for Foltz and Gordon, and directed that the 
women be admitted to Hastings.  Notwithstanding delays and appeals 
initiated by the law school, the women emerged victorious before the 
California Supreme Court.  While Foltz gained admission to Hastings, 
due to financial and family obligations, she was unable to attend law 
school and personally benefit from her achievement.  She did, however, 
value her role as a trailblazer and regarded the Hastings case as the most 
significant one in her fifty years of practice.60  This “Portia of the Pacific,” 
as she was termed, in the end obtained her degree.  On December 3, 
1990, the Hastings law faculty voted to award Foltz a posthumous juris 
doctorate degree, which was accepted by her biographer, Stanford Law 
Professor Barbara Babcock, on behalf of the family.61 
B. Apprenticeships, Law Schools and Sex Discrimination 
As was observed by the experiences of Myra Bradwell, Lavinia 
Goodell, and Clara Foltz, during the nineteenth century would-be 
attorneys typically trained for the profession by serving apprenticeships 
with established lawyers until such time as they were regarded as 
possessing the necessary knowledge and skills to seek admission to the 
bar.  The apprenticeship system afforded women a vehicle for pursuing 
a place in the profession, particularly when a husband, father, or brother 
was able and willing to incorporate them into their practice.  Many 
women, in a fashion similar to that employed by Bradwell, were trained 
by their relatives and were described as such in The Women’s Journal:  
“Nebraska’s first lady lawyer was Mrs. Ada Bittenbender, of Lincoln.  
She read law in the office of her husband”; “Mrs. Winona S. Sawyer, wife 
of the Hon. A.J. Sawyer . . . .  She began the study of law under his 
direction . . . .  While she is not actively engaged in practice, she assists 
her husband in the preparation of his cases”; and “Mrs. Mary W. Lucas, 
wife of Judge J.N. Lucas, of McCook, Neb., was admitted to practice as 
an attorney-at-law . . . .  She read law under the direction of her husband 
. . . and goes regularly to the office each day to assist in the preparation 
                                                 
58 Id. at 1277. 
59 MORELLO, supra note 1, at 62. 
60 GARZA, supra note 40, at 57. 
61 FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 152 n.9. 
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and trial of cases.”62  The benefits to both the women and their husbands 
were substantial.  The men obtained a partner who would be a helpmate, 
and the women were viewed as possessing more legitimacy and 
credibility due to their association with a male relative.  For married 
women, a partnership with their lawyer-husband further reduced the 
amount of sex discrimination they faced.  Such a partnership “not only 
shielded them from public disapproval but provided them with a secure 
and welcoming place to work.”63  The affiliations, however, appear in 
many cases to have perpetuated gender roles, with men assuming trial 
responsibilities and women relegated to office work including wills, real 
estate contracts, and paper preparation for trial.   
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, in response to complaints 
issued among attorneys and judges that the standards for training were 
insufficiently professional and intellectual, a movement toward viewing 
a law school education as a prerequisite to bar admission commenced.64  
Women seeking admission to law school confronted a nonreceptive 
attitude in most instances, akin to that experienced by Belva Lockwood, 
particularly in the East where patriarchal and discriminatory attitudes 
were deeply embedded.  In 1869, Lemma Barkaloo achieved the 
distinction of being the first woman to attend law school at Washington 
University in St. Louis, then known as St. Louis Law School, although 
she cannot claim to be the first law school graduate, as she left school 
after her first year.  She nonetheless obtained admission to the Missouri 
bar in 1870, because law school training was not yet established as 
necessary for admission to the bar.  A native New Yorker, Barkaloo 
preferred to attend law school in the East, particularly at one of the elite 
institutions whose degrees then, as today, carried more weight.  She 
applied to Harvard University and Columbia University in 1868 and was 
denied admission.  George Templeton Strong, a prominent New York 
attorney who served on the board of trustees at Columbia, tartly 
observed that the law school had received applications from “three 
infatuated young women.”  He further stated, “No woman shall degrade 
herself by practicing law in New York especially if I can save her.”65  
Washington University accepted Barkaloo’s petition for admission, and 
professors and fellow students described her as a woman of “talents and 
                                                 
62 Mary Erickson, Women Lawyers “Legitimized” by Alluding to Their Male-Lawyer 
Connections (1998), available at http://www.stanford.edu/library/wlhbp/articles/ 
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63 Drachman, Women Lawyers, supra note 13, at 2434. 
64 MORELLO, supra note 1, at 41. 
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resolution” who possessed “true moral courage.” 66  She became the first 
woman lawyer in Missouri and the second in the country, following 
Arabella Mansfield of Iowa.  Barkaloo also achieved the distinction of 
becoming the first woman lawyer in the United States to try a case in 
court.67  Barkaloo, unfortunately, succumbed to typhoid fever in 
September of 1870.  Although she garnered praise among her colleagues, 
her death engendered the same type of belittling commentary applied to 
Lavinia Goodell upon her early demise, with one authority questioning 
whether Barkaloo’s death was attributable to “over-mental exertion.”68 
The hostility toward women applicants at Columbia was expressed 
equally vehemently by Yale, the University of Pennsylvania, and 
Harvard Law Schools.  In 1872, a Yale alumnus wrote a recommendation 
favoring the admission of women if they were ugly.69  Alice Jordan’s 
attendance in 1885 and graduation from Yale proved to be an anomaly.  
Armed with a University of Michigan degree, one year at its law school 
and admission to the Michigan bar, Jordan argued her admission was 
not precluded by Yale as nothing in its catalog specifically excluded 
female attendance.  Although Yale endeavored to deter her, she insisted 
on attending classes and taking her examinations and was awarded a 
degree.70  Ironically, Yale was awarded plaudits for taking such a 
seemingly great step.  The Chicago Legal News observed, “It may be said 
with truth that the world moves, when old conservative Yale opens the 
doors of her law department for the admission of women.”71  Yale, 
evidently not persuaded by any such accolades, promptly amended its 
catalog to clarify that the law school would be open solely to male 
students.  Dean Wayland personally sent a note confirming this to Lelia 
J. Robinson, the first woman attorney in Massachusetts, who compiled 
an article entitled “Women Lawyers in the United States” for The Green 
Bag, stating to Robinson that “the marked paragraph on page 25 [of the 
catalog] is intended to prevent a repetition of the Jordan incident.”72   
In that same article by Robinson regarding women lawyers, she 
noted that Mrs. Carrie B. Kilgore was “one of the first women in the 
                                                 
66 Karen L. Tokarz, A Tribute to the Nation’s First Women Law Students, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 
89, 91 (1990). 
67 Id. at 92. 
68 Id. at 93. 
69 MORELLO, supra note 1, at 90-91. 
70 GARZA, supra note 40, at 72. 
71 First Woman Student at Yale, CHICAGO LEGAL NEWS, Sept. 1885-1886, at 59, available at 
http://www.law.stanford.edu/library/ wlhbp/articles/yale.htm. 
72 Robinson, supra note 43, at 13. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 4 [2005], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss4/3
2005] Sex Discrimination 877 
country to ask for admission to the bar, and one of the last to gain it.”73  
In addition to the typical impediments to a female law career in 
Pennsylvania (Carrie sought admission to the state bar in 1872 but did 
not obtain it until 1886), Kilgore encountered deeply rooted gender 
prejudice at the University of Pennsylvania Law School.  When her first 
application in 1870 was refused, she approached individual professors 
and attempted to attend the lectures of E. Spencer Miller.  Professor 
Miller reportedly responded, according to Kilgore:  “I do not know what 
the Board of Trustees will do, but as for me, if they admit a woman I will 
resign for I will neither lecture to niggers nor women.”74  Ten years later 
she was granted admission and graduated from Penn in 1883.  As 
Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg recently observed, however, 
once granted admission to law schools, “women were not greeted by 
their teachers and classmates with open arms and undiluted zeal.”75 
[She noted that in 1911 the student body of the 
University of Pennsylvania Law School] held a vote on a 
widely supported resolution to compel members of the 
freshman class to grow mustaches.  A twenty-five-cents-
per-week penalty was to be imposed on each student 
who failed to show substantial progress in his growth.  
Thanks to the eleventh hour plea of a student who 
remembered the lone woman in the class, the resolution 
was defeated, but only after a heated debate.76   
Perhaps no law school was as deeply entrenched in its opposition to 
the admittance of women as Harvard Law School.  It was, in fact, in 
1950, one of the last law schools to do so.77  Judith Richards Hope, a 1964 
Harvard Law graduate, found that the archives of the institution 
revealed that the members of the Harvard Corporation (the President 
and Fellows) repeatedly opposed any faculty notion of admitting 
women.  Purportedly, Harvard did not know whether “female students 
could handle the rigorous intellectual challenge of law school,” nor did it 
have confidence that “the male students could control themselves with 
                                                 
73 Id. at 28. 
74 MORELLO, supra note 1, at 67 (quoting My Application, WOMEN LAW. J. Dec. 1915). 
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young women close by.”78  In the 1870s, the applications of Ellen Martin 
and M. Fredrika Perry to Harvard were denied, as it was deemed 
impractical to simultaneously permit young men and women to the law 
library.79  After a succession of rejections of female applicants through 
the late 1880s, Harvard Corporation, in 1915, denied the applications of 
fifteen women from the Seven Sisters of the Ivy League schools as 
“contrary to the best interests of the law school.”80 
In contrast to the experience of the other law schools that excluded 
or ostracized women upon admission, the University of New York Law 
School, now New York University Law School, exhibited an unusual 
commitment to encouraging women to attend its law school.81  In 1890, it 
began admitting women and continued to serve as a leader in this area 
until it gradually grew more conservative in the 1930s and 1940s.82  To 
offer an alternative to ensure women had the opportunity to study law, 
Emma Gillett and Ellen Spencer Mussey, both graduates of Howard 
University’s law school, in 1896 created the first coeducational law 
school, Washington College of Law (now affiliated with American 
University).83  It was important that they did so, for by 1895, eighty 
percent of the country’s law schools still had not admitted women.  
Notwithstanding the passage of the nineteenth Amendment in 1920, 
many schools still refused women admission, including Harvard and 
Columbia.84 
                                                 
78 Id. at 12. 
79 FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 130 (quoting Kelly D. Weisberg, Barred from the Bar: 
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80 HOPE, supra note 77, at 14. 
81 MORELLO, supra note 1, at 80-81. 
82 Id. at 82-85. 
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C. The Equity Club, a Complement Not a Competitor 
The number of female attorneys resulting from women’s efforts to 
gain admission to law school, secure apprenticeships, and challenge 
statutory and judicial barriers to admission to the bar remained small.85  
Dispersed throughout the country, these women experienced a sense of 
isolation as they sought to reconcile their professional roles with their 
family responsibilities and traditional identities as women.  Lavinia 
Goodell baked cookies in order to appear less alien; Lelia Robinson 
seriously debated whether she should wear her hat in court to comport 
with existing standards for appropriate feminine attire or discard it so as 
to satisfy courtroom courtesy of removing one’s hat.86  In 1886, when the 
number of U.S. women lawyers approached two hundred, a group of 
women lawyers and law students at the University of Michigan founded 
the Equity Club, a correspondence organization devoted to sharing 
experiences and support, discussing women lawyers’ roles, and 
balancing professional and private duties.87  Significantly, Virginia 
Drachman observed that the name of the club was chosen specifically to 
deny the notion it was a women’s bar association seeking “pure equality 
with male lawyers, nor did they wish to sacrifice their ties to female 
culture.”88  Striving to complement, rather than compete with men, the 
women in the Equity Club did not publicly raise the banner of sex 
discrimination.  Unable to risk the alienation of supportive male 
colleagues in the profession, they instead focused upon reconciling 
private duties with public aspirations.  It is notable, however, that many 
of the women explicitly rejected the prevailing stereotypes that served to 
underlie existing discrimination.  Thus, the women overwhelmingly 
concurred that the female health limitations articulated by Dr. Edward 
Clarke were erroneous, concluding “it was the material conditions of 
women’s lives, rather than a weakness inherent to women’s reproductive 
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physiology” that prompted physical problems.89  Further, these 
nineteenth century pioneers correctly identified the tension between 
feminine identity and professional roles, a conflict that continues to 
pervade the profession in contemporary society. 
III.  THWARTED EXPECTATIONS IN EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY 
The first generation of women attorneys, the nineteenth century 
precedent setters, attained significant achievements by overcoming 
legislative and judicial barriers to the bar, negative societal 
commentaries, inhospitable receptions at law schools, and stereotypical 
assumptions regarding women’s allegedly inherent passivity, delicacy, 
and lack of mental aptitude for the rigors of law.  They envisioned that 
their assumption of the role of a woman attorney would serve to clear 
the path for others in the profession and, coupled with the vote, would 
help accelerate the demise of the confining restrictions of true 
womanhood.  While some scholars differ as to whether the women were 
feminists in the larger sense or part of a narrower women attorney 
movement,90 the characterization is less important than the substance of 
what they accomplished.  While some clearly advocated suffrage and 
expansion of women’s rights, it was their ability to establish a presence 
in the male stronghold of law, in itself, that contributed to an enlarged 
notion of a woman’s place.  With the bar of every state now open 
through judicial challenges or legislative enactment, with 1,010 female 
lawyers by 1900,91 and with most law schools accepting women, even if 
in small numbers, there existed optimism and expectations that gender 
integrated law firms and true equality of treatment would be attained.92  
The reality, however, during the first decades of the twentieth century 
was far different.  Some law schools may have opened their doors, and 
admission to the bar was attainable, but jobs outside of those associated 
with a relative were not available.   
Drachman notes that in 1920, a study was done to assess women’s 
place in the law profession.93  The study revealed thirty-eight percent of 
the women lawyers did not practice at all, large corporations provided 
none of the lucrative work for women, and sexual discrimination seemed 
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indigenous to the marketplace throughout the country.94  In the late 
nineteenth century, women attorneys, in a fashion similar to that of their 
male peers, served as general practitioners handling all types of legal 
matters, but with limited exposure to trial work, as the courtroom posed 
an arena in which women continued to face more resistance from both 
potential clients and male attorneys.  The late 1800s and thereafter, due 
to the rise of big business, witnessed the creation of both large, elite 
corporate law firms and specialization in the practice of law.95  Pursuant 
to this restructuring, gender distinctions in the practice of law became 
further emphasized; corporate law and litigation were the domain of the 
white male lawyer, and women in the 1910s and 1920s were relegated to 
domestic relations, trusts and estates, and real estate, all areas more 
compatible with the nurturing stereotypes of the nineteenth century.  
Theron G. Strong, a bar leader, wrote in his 1914 memoirs: 
It is now more than thirty years since Mrs. Lockwood 
was admitted, and the right of women to practice was 
established, but I have never yet seen a woman plead a 
case of any kind in court, and I have never met with a 
woman lawyer except . . . concerning the settlement of 
some unimportant litigation, and I think it may be safely 
asserted that there is no prospect that women will be 
seen except as a rara avis in the ranks of the legal 
fraternity.96 
Significantly, sixteen percent of women polled said sex 
discrimination was the primary reason they were not involved with the 
law; thirty-four percent attributed the demands of marriage and 
motherhood as barriers to the practice.97  If women were offered jobs in 
large firms, it often consisted of a library or clerical staff position.98 
Notwithstanding women’s ability to gain bar admittance to practice 
law, many of the bar associations remained impervious to requests for 
female attorney admissions.  The American Bar Association did not 
admit a woman as a member until 1917, and she dishearteningly stated 
law was a man’s field and would remain so.99  In response to the sex 
                                                 
94 Id. at 229-30. 
95 MORELLO, supra note 1, at 179. 
96 Id. at 176 (quoting THERON STRONG, LANDMARKS OF A LAWYER’S LIFETIME [Dodd, 
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97 Drachman, The New Woman Lawyer, supra note 92, at 235. 
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discrimination that permeated the profession, the National Association 
of Women Lawyers was formed in 1923.100  Echoing the refrain of their 
Equity Club predecessors, women also addressed the continuing 
dilemma of managing a career and family.  Some advocated 
relinquishing one’s career for the sanctity of the home; others insisted 
that with the proper companionate spouse both could be achieved.  All 
decried the fact that women would never be afforded the freedom to 
pursue one’s occupation that their male colleagues enjoyed.101  In short, 
while access to the profession in every state was evident by 1930, the 
deeply entrenched resistance to women in law and its concomitant acts 
of sex discrimination ensured that women’s optimistic aspirations of 
professional equality with men were not to be attained.102 
IV.  1930-1970:  THE POSTFEMINIST PHASE 
The numbers of women attorneys for the forty year period from 1930 
until 1970 remained small, comprising at best one to three percent of the 
profession for most of that duration.103  These figures were enlarged 
during the World War II era because of the depleted ranks of available 
male candidates for legal study.  Thus, given the absence of prospective 
males, schools felt compelled to temporarily increase the enrollment of 
women students, attaining “an unprecedented twelve percent in the fall 
of 1942.”104  Some schools, like Baylor, chose to close and others, like 
Harvard, fervently resisted the admittance of women with its president 
avowing in 1943 that it was not doing “as bad as we thought.  We have 
[seventy-five] students, and we haven’t had to admit any women.”105   
Scholars concur that subsequent to the attainment of the right to vote 
in 1920, a period of post feminism began and the small number of 
women attorneys, like other feminists of that era, no longer regarded 
themselves as part of a movement.106  With suffrage achieved, no 
consensus existed among women with regard to the manner in which 
the vote could be implemented to attain equality in other arenas.  When 
the vote failed to afford women lawyers equality in the profession, 
women sought “assimilati[on] to the male model of a lawyer,”107 much 
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as Leila Robinson had pronounced in the nineteenth century, “Do not take 
sex into the practice.  Don’t be ‘lady lawyers.’  Simply be lawyers and 
recognize no distinctions—no existence of any distinction between 
yourselves and the other members of the bar.”108  Thus, these women, 
who still tackled the struggle to balance family and work duties, would 
not “ask for individual favors or even collective recognition.”109 
It was not until the civil rights movement of the 1960s, coupled with 
Betty Friedan’s consciousness raising work in 1963, The Feminine 
Mystique, that the demographics of women in the legal profession began 
to change and did so, strikingly, in the 1970s.110  In a fashion similar to 
nineteenth century women who viewed the status of slaves as 
inescapably intertwined with their own, as property to be possessed and 
unilaterally controlled by men, women in the 1960s were inspired by the 
black civil rights movement to examine the constraints in their own lives.  
They especially examined those constraints imposed as a consequence of 
the political ideology of containment in the 1950s, which sought to limit 
the worldwide expansion of Communism and domestically encouraged 
women to return to the strict gender roles of domesticity in order that 
the home become a bulwark against the threats of the Soviet Union.111  
Friedan’s work, particularly, inspired the rebirth of the women’s 
movement and encouraged women to pursue nontraditional careers 
such as the law.112  Even the unyielding Harvard reluctantly opened its 
doors to women in 1950 and Washington and Lee did so in 1973.113  
Judith Richards Hope, a member of the Harvard class of 1964, which 
contained fifteen women, recounts the way in which sex discrimination 
continued to pervade the landscape.  Firms were reluctant to hire 
women; only a few years prior, Sandra Day O’Connor, third in her class 
at Stanford, could only secure a position as a clerk.  Hope noted that the 
law placement office at Harvard did not buck the de facto discrimination 
practiced by the firms and interpreted its role as explaining to female law 
students why applying to such firms was fruitless.114  Further, there were 
only two women’s toilets on all of Harvard’s campus; this “potty 
problem” was often proffered by schools as a rationale for avoiding the 
admittance of women.  Even in the midst of six-hour exams, women 
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were compelled to leave the building to find a bathroom.115  Blatant 
discrimination occurred in the form of “Ladies Day,” where a professor 
would only call on women to recite a few days a year, with the intent, at 
least in part, to embarrass the women and amuse the men.116  Moreover, 
most law firms, if they condescended to hire a woman, only wanted the 
symbolic “one.”  No affirmative action existed in the workplace; 
Philadelphia law firms unhesitatingly announced they did not hire 
women, and male associates were paid more than female associates.117   
The impending changes, however, originating in the early 1970s, 
were extraordinary.  The fifteen women in the Harvard Law class of 1964 
comprised three percent of the class.  By 2003, women constituted forty-
eight percent of the student body there and more than fifty percent of 
law students nationwide.118  Law schools discarded the quotas regarding 
women’s admissions in response to a number of factors, including 
pressure from the women’s burgeoning feminist movement, affirmative 
action mandates, and from litigation.  The law profession in 1964 was 
ninety-seven percent male, and by 2003, it was nearly half female.119  In 
light of these compelling figures, many are tempted to conclude equality 
has been achieved in the legal profession, or that the sheer weight of 
such numbers will exert an inexorable path to equality.  Statistics 
regarding partnership, managerial responsibility, drop out rate, and sex 
discrimination litigation with regard to women attorneys suggest 
otherwise.  For many, the real revolution of feminizing the profession 
has just begun. 
V.  A SEARCH FOR EQUAL OPPORTUNITY IN THE 1970S AND BEYOND 
The women of the 1970s and 1980s endeavored to extend the 
achievements of their counterparts of the nineteenth century.  These 
contemporary women had the elite law degrees that Lemma Barkaloo 
and Lavinia Goodell had sought; further, there were no impediments to 
bar admission such as those faced by Belva Lockwood or Myra Bradwell.  
What they now sought was to address inequality of treatment in the 
workplace.  Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act served as the basis for 
lawsuits that challenged the rampant sex discrimination practiced by law 
firms, both with respect to initial hiring and later, as related to the 
awarding of partnership.  In the 1973 case Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & 
                                                 
115 Id. at 83. 
116 Id. at 98. 
117 Id. at 153, 161, 166. 
118 Id. at 257. 
119 Id. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 4 [2005], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss4/3
2005] Sex Discrimination 885 
Wells,120 the plaintiff, a second year law student at Columbia University, 
alleged in a class action on behalf of all women lawyers similarly 
situated, that she was not hired by the law firm due to its continuous 
pattern of discrimination.  What is significant is that the court, while 
recognizing that many subjective factors contribute to an applicant’s 
qualifications that extend beyond quantifiable academic credentials, still 
asserted that this does not immunize discriminatory practices in 
professional fields from attack.121  Ultimately Margaret Kohn prevailed 
on the issue of sex discrimination and the defendant law firm agreed to 
award a certain percentage of the associate positions to women.122  In a 
similar fashion, a third year law student, Diane Serafin Blank, claimed 
the firm of Sullivan & Cromwell had engaged in sex discrimination in 
denying her employment.123  In this action, also premised on Title VII, 
the defendant employed defense tactics that were self-defeating, and 
ironically illustrative of the stereotypical prejudices it held regarding 
women.124  Sullivan & Cromwell raised the “unclean hands” defense, 
asserting Blank had set the firm up and really had no intention of joining 
the firm.125  Sullivan & Cromwell then tried to have the judge 
disqualified premised on her presumed bias based on her race, sex, and 
former advocacy for the NAACP, all of which they argued would make 
her prejudiced against the defendant.126  This case concluded with a 
settlement guaranteeing a three year review of the hiring, assignments, 
promotion, and salary schedules of Sullivan & Cromwell to assure the 
plaintiff and her counsel that no employment policies and practices 
premised on sex discrimination would persist.127 
A case that established a valuable precedent for those seeking 
freedom from employment discrimination premised on gender in the 
legal marketplace was Hishon v. King & Spalding,128 where the United 
States Supreme Court declared Title VII applicable to the selection of 
partners in a law partnership.129  Elizabeth Anderson Hishon, a Harlan 
Fiske Stone Scholar at Columbia Law,130 worked for the firm from 1972 
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until 1979, at which time she was denied partnership.131  Hishon filed 
with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, asserting that the 
firm had discriminated against her based on her gender in violation of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.132  After the EEOC issued a notice of 
right to sue, she filed in federal district court.133  The trial court and the 
Court of Appeals ruled for the defendant, arguing that Title VII was 
inapplicable to the selection of partners by a partnership, with Federal 
District Judge Newell Edenfield urging that coercing an unwanted 
partnership was the equivalent of a shotgun wedding.134  The United 
States Supreme Court concluded, however, that professional 
partnerships did come within the purview of federal antidiscrimination 
laws and Title VII scrutiny.135  While applauded by women’s bar 
associations, others skeptically opined that the consequences would not 
be more partnerships; instead, it was expressed by some that greater 
scrutiny would be afforded women attorneys in order to justify why 
they did not merit partnerships.136 
Judge Edenfield of the Federal District Court in Hishon had 
remarked that a professional partnership was in a very real sense like a 
marriage.137  While his ruling was not ultimately upheld, his analogy did 
correctly allude to the subjectivity that is inherent in such a partnership 
decision.  The characteristics one seeks in a law partner—intelligence, 
analytical ability, drive, writing ability, rainmaking prowess, oral 
communication skills, and commitment to the profession—are not 
always objectively quantifiable in the sense that three book publications, 
seven refereed articles, and six prestigious presentations might be 
deemed worthy of tenure and promotion for a professor.  In Ezold v. 
Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen,138 the issue of whether the partners’ 
subjective determination of Ezold’s potential for partnership masked 
discriminatory intent, and the extent to which the court afforded 
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deference to the partners’ rationale for denial of such partnership was at 
the core of the case.139  Nancy Ezold, while successful at the trial court 
level, ultimately lost her sex discrimination lawsuit that was based on a 
Title VII violation.140   The appellate court found that the firm had made 
a bona fide subjective assessment of her analytical ability, which the 
court did not deem a pretext for discrimination.141  Ezold had been a 
lateral hire who had graduated in the top third of her Villanova 
University School of Law class.  Lacking a law review background and 
an Ivy League pedigree, she was advised her position as an associate in 
the partnership track would not be an easy one.  Throughout her tenure, 
she was regularly reviewed pursuant to various criteria.  While she 
garnered good reviews in some areas, her assessment was not strong in 
the area of legal analysis.  Ezold was able to convince the trial court in 
her disparate treatment claim against Wolf that the employer’s 
articulated reason for denial of partnership, insufficient analytical skills, 
was mere pretext or “coverup”142 for discrimination.143  The trial court 
reached the conclusion that the proffered rationale of Wolf was 
unworthy of credence, in part by comparing Ezold’s candidacy to that of 
her peers who were afforded positive recommendations in their quest for 
partnership.144  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing, noted 
that Wolf’s denial of partnership was based on a “subtle and subjective 
consensus among the partners” that she lacked the analytical ability for 
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their complex litigation.145  Further, the court stated Wolf reserved the 
power to decide the issue by consensus.146  Notably, the Third Circuit 
held that the trial court may not substitute its subjective judgment for 
that of the law firm partnership.147 
Where promotions are dependent upon an employer’s assessment of 
various subjective criteria, as in law partnerships, rather than objective 
quantifiable factors, it makes it more difficult for a plaintiff to compare 
herself to similarly situated employees and to demonstrate pretext.  The 
Ezold case engendered significant criticism among women attorneys who 
believe it created a viable defense to sex discrimination lawsuits under 
the rubric of subjective criteria for assessment and further strengthened 
the glass ceiling.  One author asserts it created a “road map” for 
employers to avoid liability.148  The Third Circuit’s Ezold decision, in 
concluding Wolf’s tendered explanation was not pretextual and was 
applied fairly, was also criticized for exhibiting undue deference to the 
law firm’s assertion that excellent analytical ability was deemed the 
crucial requisite to the awarding of partnership status.  The court 
reasoned that it was extending the same deference and avoidance of 
unwarranted intrusion that it exhibits in analogous situations pertaining 
to academic tenure.149  Some assert the court failed to scrutinize the 
validity of Wolf’s criteria for partnership and why the firm valued that 
single criteria more than any other indicia of achievement it reviewed.150  
Yet Ezold need not be construed as an assault upon the tenets of Title 
VII prohibitions against disparate treatment premised on pretext or as an 
overly deferential acceptance of the wisdom of law firm partnership 
decisions.  Legal analytical ability was always a touted characteristic of 
Wolf, and associates were apprised of its significance.  Notwithstanding 
Ezold’s laudable achievements with respect to other lawyerly qualities 
and personal characteristics, she was advised continuously and 
repeatedly of her shortcomings in this area.  Pretext is not established by 
virtue of the fact that an employee has received some favorable 
comments or good evaluations.151  Her most ardent supporters among 
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the partners concurred as to the deficiency and requested the partnership 
standards be relaxed in order to admit her, which the partnership 
declined to do.  The firm did, in fact, practice complex litigation that 
rendered superior analytical ability an imperative.  Under these 
circumstances, while one may urge that underlying gender 
discrimination propelled the ultimate denial, one can arguably conclude 
Wolf’s proffered defense did not lack credibility or legitimacy.   
In a subsequent sex discrimination case filed by a female attorney 
against her law firm, the plaintiff successfully proved pretext for 
discrimination under Title VII.  What distinguished Masterson v. LaBrum 
and Doak152 from Ezold was twofold in nature:  the law firm exhibited 
obvious discriminatory practices as applied to Masterson to which no 
court would offer deference, and the firm had a documented history of 
discrimination toward females.  Despite her excellent reviews in terms of 
her legal abilities, client relations, billable hours, and trial experience, 
Masterson was denied partnership for failing to satisfy the partnership 
criterion of client development, a criteria of which she, unlike her male 
peers, had not been apprised prior to consideration of her candidacy.153  
Given these rather egregious circumstances, the court deemed the firm’s 
proffered reason of failure to develop business as pretextual, in that 
Masterson was assessed pursuant to a standard she was not afforded the 
opportunity to meet.154 
The Ezold and Masterson cases suggest that in order to prevail in a 
sex discrimination case, one must present rather compelling evidence of 
patently unfair behavior and distinct differences in the treatment of 
males and females, with historical discriminatory policies toward 
women providing supporting evidence of an employer’s discriminatory 
intent.  Yet, it would appear that notwithstanding the difficulty of 
pursuing a discrimination claim, Ezold and its progeny have not served 
as absolute deterrents to potential plaintiffs.  There exists a recently 
growing body of gender bias litigation where female attorneys seek to be 
afforded equal treatment with regard to attaining partnership and its 
concomitant benefits and compensation.155  Further, attorneys who 
specialize in these cases discern an increased willingness on the part of 
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women attorneys to discard a “suffer in silence” approach and to 
challenge the law firm.156 
Sexual harassment, a form of sex discrimination actionable under 
Title VII, as recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Meritor v. 
Vinson,157 evidently occurs with marked frequency in the law firm 
context.  Indeed, studies demonstrate that more than fifty percent of 
female attorneys experience sexual harassment.158  A national study 
conducted in 2001 by the American Bar Association Commission on 
Women entitled The Unfinished Agenda, indicated that despite the 
progress achieved toward gender equity in the law profession, sexual 
harassment remains an obstacle to true equality of treatment.159  
Complaints of sexual harassment, whether defined as “quid pro quo” 
claims160 or “hostile working environment” claims161 or a combination of 
both,162 may find law firms particularly vulnerable, research suggests, 
due to the influx of many female associates coupled with the mandates 
of the profession involving long hours, travel, and partner autonomy.163  
Others assert that the fear of sexual harassment claims or appearance of 
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impropriety serves as a chilling effect upon some partners’ wishes to 
mentor a female associate.164 
The perceived vulnerability of the law firm to sexual harassment 
charges primarily arises from the following two additional factors:  the 
firm’s structural composition of many partners, all of whom serve in 
some supervisory capacity over other employees, and the firm’s ethical 
responsibility to uphold the law.  The United States Supreme Court in 
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton165  held that employers face potential 
vicarious liability for the creation of unlawful hostile work environments 
by supervisors.  Jonathan H. Kurens observes that such “[l]iability takes 
root in an organization’s supervisory apparatus; and law firms are fertile 
grounds, as they have many ostensible ‘supervisors,’”166 including many 
partners who arguably are akin to CEOs of a corporation.  Clearly, a law 
firm may prove vicariously liable for an individual partner’s sexual 
harassment of an associate, but Title VII has thus far not been afforded a 
broader interpretation that would encompass a definition of partner or 
shareholder as sharing an employment relationship.167  Further, it is 
incumbent upon lawyers as guardians of the law and officers of the court 
to uphold the integrity of the law.  In Pryor v. Seyforth,168 the Court of 
Appeals, while noting that the defendant partner’s innocuous and mildly 
flirtatious conduct did not rise to the level of Title VII sexual harassment, 
admonished that “of all employers, lawyers can be expected to be most 
sensitive to charges of employment discrimination.”169  Although there 
exists other publicized accounts of instances or assertions of sexual 
harassment in law firms,170 it would appear that such claims are often 
settled rather than litigated in an effort to avoid cost and time 
expenditures indigenous to litigation and to avoid publicity for both 
parties. 
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Sexual harassment conducted by judges is regulated and disciplined 
under the American Bar Association’s Model Code of Judicial 
Conduct,171 which requires judges to comport themselves without 
gender bias or prejudice and specifically prohibits sexual harassment.  In 
the 1993 case of In the Matter of Judge Edward J. Seaman,172 Judge Seaman’s 
law clerk, Barbara Denny, alleged that the judge violated several canons 
of the Code of Judicial Conduct, including Canons 1, 2, 2A, 3A(3) and 
3A(4),173 by engaging in various kinds of sexual harassment.  The jurist’s 
pattern of abusive behavior included making remarks to her of a sexual 
nature and repeatedly touching her, including reaching under her calf 
length skirt to touch her knees.  The court found clear and convincing 
evidence that the judge’s misconduct was demonstrated by “a pattern of 
behavior that was offensive and inimical to the employee.”174  Deeming 
sexual harassment of women by men among the most pervasive, serious, 
and debilitating forms of gender discrimination, the court held that 
sexual harassment of a law clerk by a judge warranted a sixty-day 
suspension without pay.175  Judge Seaman subsequently resigned. 
Currently, testimony is being presented before the New Jersey 
Supreme Court’s Advisory Committee on Judicial Conduct regarding 
allegations of sexual harassment on the part of Superior Court Judge 
Randolph M. Subryan.  Judicial clerk Jennifer Breaton’s allegations 
include incidents involving a forced kiss and an offer to share racy 
photos.176  Purportedly, the judge told his law clerk she was “going to 
turn me into Judge Seaman,” a reference she did not initially 
understand.177  The judge’s attorney has focused on presenting evidence 
that portrays the tone and atmosphere of the judge’s office as one of fun 
                                                 
171 Id. at 211, 212-14 (citing examples of judicial violations of the code as it pertains to 
sexual harassment); see also Marina Angel, Sexual Harassment by Judges, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV. 
817 (1991). 
172 627 A.2d 106 (1993). 
173 The Supreme Court of New Jersey noted specifically that Canon 1 proclaims that a 
judge must uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary; Canon 2 states judges 
should avoid impropriety and the appearances of impropriety; Canon 2A advises that a 
judge must respect and comply with all laws in a manner that promotes public confidence 
in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary; Canon 3A(3) instructs a judge to be 
courteous and dignified to all with whom he or she interacts in an official capacity, and 
Canon 3A(4) states specifically that a judge should not discriminate due to “race, color, 
religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, national origin, marital status, socioeconomic status, 
or handicap.”  Id. at 109. 
174 Id. at 120. 
175 Id. at 124. 
176 Robert G. Seidenstein, He Grabbed Me and Kissed Me, 13 N.J. LAW 1117 (2004). 
177 Robert G. Seidenstein, Judge Says He’s Wrongly Accused, 13 N.J. LAW 1361 (2004). 
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and camaraderie.178  Breaton, in fact, chuckled at some memories of her 
dealings with the judge, acknowledging under questioning that the 
judge was committed to expanding opportunities for women and 
minorities, that she had worn a clown nose along with others in the 
office, and that she had purchased a t-shirt for him while she was on 
vacation.179  Witnesses supportive of the judge all asserted the respected 
jurist cultivated a relaxed atmosphere in chambers.  The case has not yet 
been decided, but it points to the difficulties inherent in a sexual 
harassment lawsuit.  It often involves, firstly, the classic “he said, she 
said” scenario.  More importantly, as noted by Cynthia Fuchs Epstein: 
Because women today expect equality, they have low 
tolerance for sexist behavior, particularly disrespectful 
comments and jokes, and no tolerance for sexual 
harassment.  Because of the subtle form of this behavior 
and the fuzzy boundaries between friendliness, joking, 
hostility and discrimination—as well as of the 
generational differences in interpretations of harmful 
intent—there are considerable problems in identifying 
sources of sexual discrimination and sexual 
harassment.180 
Unquestionably, sexual harassment and sex discrimination, which 
employ gender stereotypes and regard women as a group rather than as 
individuals, “provide serious obstacles to mobility” and hence contribute 
to the glass ceilings.181 
VII.  REMAINING GENDER INEQUITIES IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 
The extraordinary inroads made by women in terms of the numbers 
participating in the legal profession have been duly noted in a 2003 
report by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(“EEOC”).182  This report, entitled Diversity in Law Firms, notes that in 
1970, Ivy League white Protestant males dominated the elite law firms, 
with an almost total exclusion of women.  By 1990, 36.2% of all associates 
in such firms were women.  Supreme Court Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
                                                 
178 Robert G. Seidenstein, Judge’s Lawyer:  He Set a Friendly Office Climate, 13 N.J. LAW 1169 
(2004). 
179 Id. 
180 Epstein, supra note 164, at 371. 
181 Id. at 303-04.  
182 Diversity in Law Firms, at www.eeoc.gov/stats/reports/diversitylaw/index.html (last 
visited May 10, 2004). 
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observes that women are more than fifty percent of the law school 
population, forty-one percent of new associates at large firms, twenty-
three percent of full professors with tenure, hold nearly twenty-five 
percent of all federal judgeships, and have served in nearly every state as 
president of state bar associations.183  Given these figures, coupled with 
the fact that firms were partnering women and exhibiting responsiveness 
to the work-family issues, Epstein asserts that in the late 1980s, it 
“appeared that the sheer number of women entering the profession 
would lead to fundamental changes in certain long-prevailing 
professional paradigms.”184  Yet, inequities do exist despite the popular 
belief that women are no longer discriminated against in the legal 
profession, or as Deborah Rhode terms this, the “‘No problem’ 
Problem.”185  The facts show that the odds of a woman being made 
partner is less than one third of the odds for a man being named 
partner.186  The economics of the 1990s, which included a reduction in 
business with a concomitant downsizing of law firms, drastically 
reduced the opportunity for hiring and promotion of women.187  Further, 
studies of attrition of women from the profession suggest that a smaller 
proportion of women law graduates engage in law practice and a greater 
proportion of them depart the profession than do their male 
colleagues.188 
The 2003 EEOC report indicates that the most pressing equal 
employment issue in large national law firms is no longer hiring, but 
rather the conditions of employment, particularly promotion to 
partnership.189  Under the “up and out” system utilized by the large 
firms (whereby generally one’s partnership potential is formally assessed 
at about eight to ten years subsequent to a first year associateship, with a 
negative determination resulting in the termination of any relationship 
with the firm), women fare poorly.  In a study whereby cohorts of first 
year associates for the years 1973-1974 and 1985-1986 were tracked for 
ten years, for the entire period nineteen percent of the men gained 
partnership, while only eight percent of the women did so.190  Thus, 
                                                 
183 Shining a Lamp, supra note 75, at 32. 
184 Epstein, supra note 164, at 295. 
185 Aliza Anvari, Rhode: Sex Discrimination in Legal Profession Still Problem, THE NEBRASKA 
TRANSCRIPT 11 (2001). 
186 Diversity in Law Firms, supra note 182, at 16. 
187 Epstein, supra note 164, at 295. 
188 Fiona M. Kay, Flight from Law:  A Competing Risks Model of Departures from Law Firms, 
31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 301, 302 (1997). 
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women have a “distinctly unequal position” among lawyers.191  The lack 
of women partners as evidence of gender bias in the legal profession is a 
refrain echoed in much of the literature.  Many note that women are 
disproportionately represented among associates and underrepresented 
as partners.192  Hagan and Kay observe that women enter law firms in 
large numbers, yet with prospects of partnership uncertain, many leave 
within the first few years of practice.193  While some of the disparity is 
attributable to individual preferences, constraints continue to affect 
women’s professional career opportunities.194 
Rhode challenges the “myths of meritocracy,” which assert women 
attorneys have equality of opportunity.  Citing studies promulgated by 
the 1995 American Bar Association’s Commission on the Status of 
Women, a Harvard Women’s Law Association study, and the “Glass 
Ceilings” study released in 1996 by the Bar Association of New York 
City, Rhode observes that proportionate representation is lacking not 
only in numbers of partners but in tenured law school faculty and law 
school deans as well.195 
Another symptom of disparate treatment of women in the law 
profession is that women, to some extent, still appear to be concentrated 
in areas that are related to stereotypical gender roles, such as family law 
and trusts and estates, in contrast to the “hard” corporate law or 
litigation inhabited by males.  Hull and Nelson conclude that there is 
evidence of both “horizontal and vertical gender segregation within the 
practice of law despite women’s rapid numerical integration into the 
profession since the early 1970s.”196  They assert that data shows women 
are underrepresented in the private practice or law firm setting and 
overrepresented in government and public trust law.197  The EEOC 
report indicates, for example, that 20.7% of white women attorneys are 
employed by the government or the judiciary, in contrast to 7.6% of 
                                                 
191 Id. at 16. 
192 Fiona M. Kay & John Hagan, Cultivating Clients in the Competition for Partnership: 
Gender and the Organizational Restructuring of Law Firms in the 1990s, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
517, 521 (2000). 
193 Id. at 522. 
194 Kathleen E. Hull & Robert L. Nelson, Assimilation, Choice, or Constraint?  Testing 
Theories of Gender Differences in the Careers of Lawyers, 79 SOC. FORCES 229 (2000). 
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white men.198  The percentages of African-American lawyers and 
Hispanic lawyers in government and the judiciary are higher, 43.8% and 
37.5%, respectively.199  Moreover, women occupy less prestigious and 
less remunerative positions that deal with “personal plight, and that can 
be held on a part time basis.”200  Fiona Kay even goes so far as to 
characterize the legal profession as a ghettoizing occupation, rather than 
an integrating field, due to the manner in which women are “more 
highly represented among positions of lower authority, lower 
supervisory powers and lower prestige.”201 
Because women have not attained genuine integration, are relegated 
to less remunerative specialties, and are partnered at a lower rate, 
women are also overrepresented in what has sometimes been termed 
“flight from the law.”  The EEOC report, citing the 2003 National 
Association for Law Placement Foundation Study of entry level hiring 
and attrition, notes that as compared to men as a whole, minority males, 
minority females and white females are more likely to have departed 
their employer within fifty-five months of their start date.202  One study 
indicated that forty-six percent of men leave their firms, while fifty-nine 
percent of women do so, thus perpetuating the glass ceiling as to 
partnership.203  The problem of flight from the profession appears 
particularly acute for minority women associates.  In 2004, the National 
Association of Law Placement observed data that suggested that within 
eight years of joining a large firm, nearly one hundred percent of 
minority women attorneys depart from the firms compared with 
attrition rates of 73.3% for all associates and 74.6% for white women 
associates.204   
                                                 
198 Diversity in Law Firms, supra note 182, at 2-3 (quoting Monique R. Payne and Robert L. 
Nelson, Shifting Inequalities:  Stratification by Race, Gender, and Ethnicity in an Urban Legal 
Profession, 1975-1995, 2003, unpublished manuscript) 
199 Id. at 3. 
200 Kay & Hagan, supra note 192, at 522 (quoting Richard L. Abel, Comparative Sociology of 
Legal Professions, in LAWYERS IN SOCIETY: THE CIVIL LAW WORLD 118 (R. L. Abel & P.S. C. 
Lewis eds., 1989)). 
201 Kay, Flight, supra note 188, at 307. 
202 Diversity in Law Firms, supra note 182, at 3. 
203 Kay & Hagan, supra note 192, at 537. 
204 Jeff Blumenthal, ABA to Examine Career Paths of Minority Women Lawyers, 230 THE 
LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 3 (2004).  Philadelphia statistics, however, reflect a 64% attrition rate 
for women minority attorneys.  See Alex Dubilet, Percentage of Women Minority Partners 
Rises but Numbers Still Low, Recruitment Study Says, 231 THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 7, 8, 16 
(2004).  Dubilet notes that despite efforts to recruit, retain and promote minority attorneys 
in Philadelphia, women minority partners comprise less than one percent of all partners in 
the city.  Scant attention has been afforded the experience of minority women, who 
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Kay notes that even with emerging firm policies on part-time work 
and maternity leave, all women confront continuing tension between the 
demands of their careers and their families, and such conflicts prompt 
their departures.205  When queried why they change jobs, male lawyers 
respond that it is motivated by an attractive opportunity; women 
indicate it arises as a result of disaffection with one’s current position 
and the difficulty of balancing all tasks.206  It is possible, however, that 
with the current restructuring in law firms, which offers a departure 
from the traditional up and out option through a variety of positions 
encompassing nonequity partner, special counsel, and permanent 
associate, the flight of women and of men might be stemmed. 
The gender gap in wages for lawyers has traditionally been cited as 
persuasive evidence of the discrimination seemingly indigenous to this 
male-modeled profession.  The EEOC report, for example, in examining 
law school graduates from 1972 to 1978 and 1979 to 1985, states that the 
gender gap remained constant; and fifteen years after graduating, 
women in both time cohorts earned approximately sixty-nine percent of 
                                                                                                             
confront discrimination premised both on race and gender, in the law profession.  This is 
due, in part, to the lack of such women entering law school until the 1990s.  Drachman 
recounts the “paltry” numbers of black women lawyers that existed during various time 
periods; in 1940, for instance, while there were 4,146 white women lawyers in the country, 
only thirty-nine female African American attorneys existed.  See Drachman, The New 
Woman Lawyer, supra note 92, at 234.  In 1990, census figures indicate there were eleven 
thousand black women lawyers as contrasted with 161,044 white women lawyers.  See 
REBELS IN LAW: VOICES IN HISTORY OF BLACK WOMEN LAWYERS 77, 297 Appendix C (J. Clay 
Smith, Jr. ed., 1998).  Epstein observes in her “Glass Ceilings” report that she had hoped to 
analyze the experience of female minority attorneys, but that there were so few minority 
senior associates and partners in the large firms that the meager data would not support a 
reasonable analysis.  See Epstein, supra note 164, at 324.  In the eight large corporate law 
firms which comprised the study, there existed in 1992 one black female partner in stark 
contrast to the fifty-eight white female partners and twenty-four black female associates, as 
compared to 281 white female associates.  See Epstein, supra note 164, at 324, Table II.10.  
Thus, while there exists much anecdotal information regarding female minority attorneys, 
such as the accounts of Charlotte E. Ray, the first African American woman lawyer in the 
United States, or the achievements of Sadie Alexander, the first black female recipient of a 
Ph.D. and the first black woman to receive a law degree from the University of 
Pennsylvania, there exists insufficient hard data regarding female minority attorneys.  See 
GARZA, supra note 40, at 65; MORELLO, supra note 1, at 145-48; REBELS IN LAW, supra, at 17.   
The prospect for more definitive data is encouraging, as the American Bar Association in 
2004 announced its intention to examine the experience of minority women in the law 
profession through a Research Project on the Retention and Advancement of Women of 
Color.  See Blumenthal, supra, at 3. 
205 Kay, Flight, supra note 188, at 328. 
206 Katharine T. Bartlett, Women in the Legal Profession: The Good News and the Bad, at 
http://gos.sbc.edu/b/bartlett.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2003). 
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men’s earnings.207  Although initially there exists no disparity in earnings 
at the entry level in large firms, the gap develops early and widens with 
time.208  The issue of differences in salaries, however, is a complex one 
that results from sex discrimination but is also impacted by the number 
of hours an attorney works, the number of billable hours charged to 
clients, and the amount of billable hours actually collected from clients.  
Further, compensation is determined by one’s status of full-time or part-
time and one’s rainmaking abilities.  The EEOC study suggests that the 
most significant factors negatively influencing earnings are the 
differences in hours worked and whether one assumes responsibility for 
childcare.209  Clearly, with the increased emphasis on billable hours 
witnessed in large law firms, with firms expecting fifty to sixty hours of 
work per week, with minimum annual billables of 2000 to 2300 hours, it 
becomes difficult for a woman bearing family responsibilities to 
compete.  An increasingly significant indicator of success, important to 
attaining partnership, is one’s ability to attract and maintain new 
business from both new and existing clients.  Women have not yet 
achieved success in this area, and reasons for this deficiency include a 
lack of mentoring by senior partners, a failure to receive quality work 
assignments from male partners, shortages of time to devote to 
marketing and engendering business due to family responsibilities, and 
perceived stereotypical assumptions by peers that they will not be 
successful in rainmaking.210  Further, women are perceived as being at a 
disadvantage in rainmaking, because they lack necessary networks of 
business acquaintances.  Yet it should be noted that women do not 
always feel they are particularly suited for rainmaking, and thus, 
stereotypes with regard to women’s lack of aptitude for business matters 
that are projected onto women are sometimes “embraced” by women 
themselves, who believe that developing business is an intrinsic ability 
for which men have an innate skill.211  Women are also perceived as 
being at a disadvantage in rainmaking because the business network 
they do possess lacks sufficient numbers of women in positions of 
authority to give business to women lawyers.  Some women do, in fact, 
resent rainmaking, particularly those who sought a large firm precisely 
                                                 
207 Diversity in Law Firms, supra note 182, at 3. 
208 Bartlett, supra note 206. 
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due to its institutional client base, which typically would render 
rainmaking unnecessary.212  These women construe their roles as solely 
one of servicing client needs and believe the profession is degraded by 
moves to make it more business oriented.  Rainmaking, however, in 
today’s highly competitive economy, with reduced client loyalties, 
increased expenses, lateral movement of attorneys, and an ever 
increasing supply of lawyers, is a crucial component of making partner 
and should not be deemed a discretionary activity for one who desires 
that status and its accompanying wages. 
The timeless problem of balancing commitment to one’s profession 
and to one’s family is a burden that predominantly confronts women in 
the legal profession and underlies gender inequality in a variety of ways.  
Women attorneys in the nineteenth century, such as Clara Foltz and 
Belva Lockwood, required a supportive structure in order to pursue their 
professional lives; Clara’s mother helped care for her five children and 
Belva’s adult daughter engaged in housekeeping for her mother.213  
While contemporary attorneys do not have to surmount the enormous 
hurdles and societal criticisms these women faced in trying to balance 
private and professional concerns, one arguably can say the demands of 
the profession today are increasingly more onerous.  The average billable 
hours expected at major law firms in 1990 was about 1600 hours a year; 
now it is approximately 2300 hours per year, and that figure reflects a 
trend among firms to increase the target figure.214  In a legal culture 
typified by a traditionally male profile, which encompasses “continuous 
employment, inflexible hours of labor and minimal workplace support in 
response to demands of parenting,” and rainmaking, the demands of the 
profession contribute to sex segregation.215  This affords women, who 
assume greater family responsibilities than do their male peers, little 
time for pregnancy and parenting, and may subject them to differential 
treatment in the workplace by partners who perceive their ability to 
perform as being limited by family circumstances.216  As a result of the 
“sweatshop” hours expected of full-time attorneys, a second-class status 
is imposed upon the practitioner who cannot fulfill these standards.217 
Faced with these demands, women feel compelled to make a choice 
in balancing a career and family.  Some choose to work only a few years 
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and purposefully relinquish any hope of attaining partnership, thus 
fueling the noted attrition rate.  Others utilize family oriented policies 
adopted in recent years which typically permit what is deemed part-time 
work that encompasses a daily routine of nine to five, or four days, and 
have earned the moniker of mommy track.  Underlying these choices, 
however, is the awareness that one cannot expect to rigidly adhere to 
reduced hours when the necessities of work require one’s presence and 
participation during allegedly “off” days.  Still others opt for extended 
leaves to accommodate pregnancy and childcare.  Those who adopt 
these alternatives necessarily confront accompanying reduced wages, 
may incur resentment by their colleagues, and may witness a reduced 
chance of partnership status.  The unspoken premise underlying the 
mommy track is that it is incompatible with advancement.218  These 
various forms of flexible work hours are occupied almost solely by 
women and lead to another gender specific stereotype that women are 
less ambitious than men.219  Rhode suggests that many lawyers assume 
women prioritize family commitments, which serve to constrain 
professional achievement and leads to gender inequalities.220  While she 
concurs that there is merit in the proposition that some women have a 
different life preference, she disputes that this is the cause of sex 
discrimination, for only about four percent of female associates choose 
part-time work or a flexible schedule, and gender disparities exist among 
lawyers in similar full-time positions.221  Women, in short, do not choose 
positions with fewer demands on time and travel because of some 
genetically predisposed preference.  Instead, they “choose” part-time 
alternatives and career sacrifices because, lacking men’s support in 
shouldering family responsibilities and male colleagues’ support of 
alternative arrangements for practicing law, there really is no choice for 
women at all.222  As observed by Epstein in her report for the New York 
City Bar Association, both women, who have adopted stereotypical 
views of themselves, and men share the expectation that women will not 
be as professionally committed once they incur family responsibilities.223  
By accepting this view, women succumb to glass ceilings imposed by the 
gatekeepers or the senior members of the partnership, who establish firm 
practices, policies and perspectives on what constitutes commitment and 
                                                 
218 Epstein, supra note 164, at 296. 
219 Id. at 339. 
220 Rhode, supra note 195, at 591. 
221 Id. 
222 Id. 
223 Epstein, supra note 164, at 298. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 4 [2005], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss4/3
2005] Sex Discrimination 901 
professionalism pursuant to a male model, and those imposed by 
themselves that reflect cultural and familial expectations.224 
A new trend in law school admissions is becoming evident, and if 
adopted by a significant number of law schools, could arguably 
exacerbate the tension that exists between commitments to family and 
profession.  For most women attorneys, the decade subsequent to law 
school graduation is a time within which the hopeful ascendancy toward 
partnership will occur; at the same time women are aware that with age 
decreasing chances of pregnancy, it makes a decision imperative in that 
area as well.  Many women seek to attain partnership status first, as 
family commitments clearly restrain upward mobility.  Northwestern 
University School of Law has instituted a strategic plan which mandates 
that applicants possess a minimum of two years of work experience in a 
non law-related area, with such experience reflecting substantial 
responsibilities.  Kathleen Kunkle Gilbert queries whether women “have 
truly advanced past separate spheres ideology” as evidenced by this 
plan which “ignores the fact that women have only a finite amount of 
time to have children.”225  The plan also disregards the fact that in recent 
years law firms have lengthened the time requisite to attaining 
partnership from approximately five years to a current associateship of 
nine years.  Coupled with the two-year work experience mandate, 
women may indeed find that their family planning is significantly 
burdened. 
The rationale underlying this plan is that it will produce more 
successful students who are more conversant with a competitive 
business world.  Northwestern anticipates their applicants will be more 
mature and thus, better law graduates.  Gilbert contends this plan will 
make childbearing decisions for women attorneys more difficult.226  They 
will be older when they matriculate, when they pursue partnership and 
parenthood, and will be dealing with a compressed period of time 
within which to balance professional and private commitments.  Gilbert 
asserts that Northwestern’s “oversight is inherently founded upon an 
ideal male student and worker,” and will adversely impact female law 
students, possibly discouraging them from pursuing law as a 
profession.227  This reliance upon the ideal male profile for prospective 
students would seem to further reinforce the traditional masculine 
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norms of the legal profession.  Interestingly, research suggests the new 
mandatory two-year requirement may not, in fact, achieve its intended 
result of producing better lawyers.  A recent study by the National 
Association for Law Placement, entitled Second Career Lawyers, indicates 
that while the subject lawyers perceive themselves as bringing maturity, 
a strong work ethic and experience with clients to the firm, their 
professional achievements as compared to those who went directly to 
law school after college were not discernibly different.228  Those who had 
work experience prior to law school took just as long to achieve 
partnership, were accorded very similar bonuses, and it was rare for 
them to receive seniority or salary credit for prior work.229  Thus, a 
requirement designed to produce superior attorneys may accomplish 
little more than having a disparate effect on women attorneys, further 
burdening their ability to balance family and career demands, as well as 
their ability to attain partnership. 
VI.  WOMEN’S FUTURE IMPACT ON THE PROFESSION 
The nineteenth century women attorneys overcame formidable 
legislative, judicial and cultural obstacles to gain entry into the 
exclusively male profession.  The second wave of trailblazers, beginning 
in the 1970s, entered law schools and the profession in remarkable 
numbers, ultimately establishing a presence even in the elite law firms, 
but still confronting the difficulty in achieving equity within those firms 
and addressing the timeless issue of satisfactorily balancing gender and 
professional roles.  Many commentators, such as Cynthia Fuchs Epstein, 
assert that women now seek a “paradigm shift” that would move 
beyond seeking equality in the profession and would transform the 
culture of the law firm.230  Barbara Babcock of Stanford Law urges that 
the next step, the “real revolution,” should witness women “preparing to 
claim the pioneer legacy but not by continuing the balancing act.  
Instead, the new lawyers are gearing to change the profession so that it 
truly accommodates women.”231  Those who seek what is sometimes 
viewed as the feminization of the profession assert the timeliness of the 
proposed revolution:  the esteem of the profession is low, the hours are 
extraordinarily demanding, the profession is permeated with greed, 
disaffection within the profession is high, and they decry the fact law has 
become a bottom line business.232  In short, it is believed that the 
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confluence of these factors and the impressive numbers of women and 
their sympathetic male colleagues can effect this goal. 
In her research, Epstein noted that older female attorneys exhibit 
“markedly different attitudes toward glass ceiling issues,” and view 
younger women’s belief that “firms should change to accommodate the 
reality of working caregivers” as unrealistic.233  As a member of the older 
generation of women attorneys who benefited from the newly created 
access to law school in the 1970s, one is sympathetic to the desire of 
women and men to transform the profession by departing from its 
historic male model; it is, indeed, a profession that in the words of Clara 
Foltz, is hard and relentless.234  There exist serious impediments and 
constraints to such a dramatic proposition, however, that may make such 
change very difficult to attain in the near future. 
Researchers and commentators continually stress the critical mass of 
women in the profession, alluding to the power that can be exerted by 
this force.  Rarely do they stress the incredible growth the legal 
profession as a whole has experienced in the last fifty years, nor the 
practical consequences of such growth.  The supply of lawyers has 
soared:  there were approximately two hundred thousand in 1950, seven 
hundred thousand in 1988 and by 2000, the number of lawyers had 
exceeded one million.235  Given the U.S. Census figures for those years of 
populations of 151 million, 244 million, and 281 million,236 respectively, 
this translates into one lawyer for every 755 people in 1950, one lawyer 
for every 350 people in 1988, and one lawyer for every 281 people in the 
year 2000.  Research that addressed the rate of growth for thirty 
professions and technical occupations concludes that the legal profession 
grew faster than the average profession and expanded twice as fast as 
medicine and three times as fast as the experienced civilian labor force.237  
While the 1980s economy, coupled with expansion of major 
corporations, and governmental regulations, fueled growth, the last 
decade has witnessed heretofore rare occurrences, including dismissal of 
partners, and closing of major firms, and the increase in lateral 
movement for purposes of obtaining enhanced opportunities, all of 
                                                 
233 Epstein, supra note 164, at 299. 
234 See supra note 1. 
235 Charlotte Chiu & Kevin T. Leicht, When Does Feminization Increase Equality? The Case of 
Lawyers, 33 LAW & SOC. REV. 557, 565-66 (1999). 
236 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION, HOUSING UNITS, AREA MEASUREMENTS AND 
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which place a new emphasis on “production and tangible results.”238  
Kaye notes that it is not unusual to find law firms with lawyers 
numbering in the hundreds.  Entering classes of associates numbering 
thirty-nine and up, “must know that the odds are overwhelmingly 
against lifetime association.”239  Moreover, it is ironic that 
notwithstanding the recorded disaffection observed in the profession,240 
applicants to law schools are doing so in record numbers.  For the fall 
2003 matriculated class of Boston University School of Law, which 
comprises 267 seats, 7246 individuals applied.  The University of 
Pennsylvania Law School for that same year received 5140 applications 
for a class of 260.  In 2003, George Washington University Law School 
received 11,687 applications for a class of 536 students.241 
Thus, the growth in the numbers of lawyers intensifies the highly 
competitive atmosphere and alters the nature of the practice; what is 
already an inherently adversarial and demanding occupation becomes 
even further characterized by those traits.  Billable hours keep 
increasing, and more importantly, the degree to which those hours 
generate collections receives more rigorous scrutiny.  The partner to 
associate ratio has also increased, as has the length of time in the 
partnership track deemed requisite for attaining partnership, and the 
criteria for partnership has been raised.  Firms compete for a diminishing 
client base, which has prompted, in part, the perceived overly 
aggressive, crass behavior that has earned the scorn of its critics both 
within and without the profession.242  Clients no longer have the same 
                                                 
238 Judith S. Kaye, Women Lawyers in Big Firms:  A Study in Progress Toward Gender 
Equality, 57 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 114 (1988). 
239 Id. at 113. 
240 For Some Attorneys, the Law’s a Downer, 13 N.J. LAW. 1449 (2004).  The article reports 
that on any given day, approximately forty-one percent of the members of the legal 
profession were actively seeking an alternative livelihood.  Poor advancement chances, 
billable hours pressure, family obligations and pressure to solicit new business were cited 
as reasons for the dissatisfaction.  It should be noted that the article observes that for many 
attorneys becoming a lawyer has not been a lifelong interest to them; they have “defaulted 
into it” and became attorneys not out of passion, but rather a desire to continue their 
education.  Id. at 1487. 
241 See Boston University School of Law, Admissions, available at  www.bu.edu/law/ 
admissions/profile/index.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2004); University of Pennsylvania 
Law School, Class Statistics, available at www.upenn.edu/prospective/jd/classstatistics. 
html (last visited Aug. 28, 2004); George Washington University Law School, GW Law at a 
Glance, available at www.law.gwu.edu/welcome/glance.asp (last visited Aug. 28, 2004). 
242 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., a professor and ethics expert at the University of 
Pennsylvania Law School, observes that conflict of interest lawsuits filed by clients against 
law firms emerge as a consequence of the “intense competition for new business.”  Karen 
Donovan, When Big Law Firms Trip over Their Own Clients, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2004 at BU 5.  
In such cases, clients assert that the law firm has violated its duty of loyalty to them by 
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loyalty to the firm; they farm out work to several firms and are 
susceptible to the entreaties of competitor firms offering incentives.  
They no longer accept bills that simply state, “for services rendered” as 
they did through the 1980s; now bills must be fully described in six 
minute or fifteen minute intervals.  Moreover, the lack of client loyalty 
and the need to be accessible to those clients only exacerbates the 
problem of the work hours deemed requisite to an attainment of 
partnership in a firm.  There exists, due to the inordinate number of 
attorneys, great competition for clients, and those clients want ready 
access to their lawyers.  Those who espouse the idea that partners use 
“client expectancy” as a pretext for sex discrimination give insufficient 
weight to the reality of client demand.  Many clients of large firms do not 
function within a nine to five framework themselves, and expect their 
attorneys to be similarly inclined.  This factor will continue to pose a 
stigma problem for those women and men who choose part-time work.  
Even a female attorney working for a corporation who fully supports the 
idea of a flexible schedule for lawyers indicates “having a part-time 
attorney working on a matter of which she is in charge is impractical and 
thus undesirable.”243  Eve B. Burton opines that long hours may not be 
necessary in a law firm, that a “Cadillac” work performance is not a 
requisite for a client who will be content with a “Ford” that gets the job 
done.244  While clearly clients are more cost conscious today, those clients 
of the large, elite firms expect a superior product—so, too, does the 
corporate counsel who hires a particular law firm and remains ultimately 
responsible for the performance of that firm.  Moreover, it is the billable 
hours that, in major part, remain crucial to a firm’s profitability, and 
hence, an attorney’s efforts to reduce his or her hours will be regarded as 
reflective of a lack of commitment to the firm.  The unalterable bottom 
line is that lawyers’ compensation and profitability are premised on the 
fees they generate. 
Several commentators suggest that part-time and flex-time be more 
liberally employed and that such reduction in time not be regarded as 
inconsistent with advancement.245  Others urge that all firms demand 
less hours, with the result that short-hour attorneys would be dispersed 
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throughout firms, prejudicing no firm competitively.246  In this manner, 
women, who are now among the top law school graduates and who 
bring a unique set of relational skills to the bargaining table,247 would be 
deterred from engaging in “firm flight,” and the firms would not be 
burdened with the costs of attrition.  While it is true that turnover is 
costly to a large firm, as associates are not very profitable in their early 
years while they are at the same time commanding formidable wages, 
the fact remains that fixed overhead costs per each attorney, including 
very high rents in metropolitan areas, support staff, computer systems, 
and insurance rates which are skyrocketing due to a rise in malpractice 
claims, remain unaltered.  One must not merely balance the costs of 
attrition versus the costs of offering part or flex time; one must consider 
the costs of all these alternatives against the substantial fixed costs 
associated with each attorney and the fact that the generation of fees is 
crucial to both one’s individual compensation and firm profit.  Others 
proffer ideas regarding alternative forms of compensation that would 
end reliance on the “time famine” associated with the emphasis on 
billable hours.248  Mechanisms such as value billing, fixed fee billing, and 
mixed compensation models are touted as affording release from the 
ubiquitous billable hours.249  There are difficulties inherent in each 
approach.  Value billing is rather impractical for some disciplines and 
has been discarded by most law firms.  Litigation, for example, is valued 
at its conclusion, and it is unrealistic to saddle a client with a large bill at 
the end of a case even if the result and the fee are meritorious.  Further, a 
firm depends on continuous and monthly billings in order to meet its 
financial obligations.  Fixed fee is not acceptable to many, as attorneys 
very often unknowingly understate the magnitude of their services that 
will be required.  Moreover, pursuant to a fixed fee, a client is free to 
make unlimited calls with no concern for incurring added costs.  Mixed 
compensation, a reduction of compensation in exchange for more 
discretionary time, fails to resolve the issue of the fixed costs associated 
with each attorney or the overall profitability of the firm.  Potential 
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transformation of the law profession to accommodate women and men, 
who are desirous of reduced billable hours accompanied by a realistic 
chance at partnership, always confronts the reality of the fact that law is 
a business operating in an intensely competitive and costly environment. 
Some commentators bemoan the fact that law has been degraded, in 
their view, from a profession to a business and state, for example, that 
“the bottom line mentality representative of most firms today is a major 
problem.”250  Critics see it not merely as a question of survival of a firm 
in a competitive atmosphere but attribute the business orientation as one 
that is fueled by the insistence on maintaining and expanding very high 
incomes for senior partners.251  It is precisely those senior partners, 
however, who usually are the major rainmakers that attract the client 
base, which supports the wages of others and upon which the firm relies.  
Others urge that movement toward diversity must necessarily embrace 
more unconventional attitudes and discard the rigid structure that 
currently exists in firms.  Indeed, many firms have incorporated 
departures from the up and out system in the form of permanent 
associates and part-time attorneys,252 but often with a concomitant 
reduction in pay unless it is an extremely large firm of several hundred 
attorneys which can afford defining specialized core competencies and 
compensating for levels of expertise.  And other commentators assert 
that firms must transform to better accommodate women because law 
firm growth has exceeded the supply of the elite students from which 
large firms typically draw253 and that women are an increasing 
percentage of the declining pool.254  While the first statement may have 
been true several years ago, today that no longer remains the case, as the 
abundant supply of law students has caused students from the elite 
schools, who ordinarily would have sought the highest paying positions 
in New York, to compete for jobs in the smaller markets.255  The vast 
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numbers of attorneys in the marketplace as compared to population 
figures and the continuing addition of thousands more per year serve to 
intensify competition and strengthen the business orientation that law 
has increasingly adopted.  The high costs incurred by a firm for wages of 
attorneys, staff, and overhead must be supported by client retention and 
client recruitment, both of which require lengthy hours and a sensitivity 
to that bottom line.  Rainmaking can no longer be deemed the sole 
province of the senior partners and other “stars” as it was in the 1970s 
and 1980s, where other attorneys could still be partnered if they excelled 
in solely servicing the existing client base.  Today, being an excellent 
attorney will generally be regarded as insufficient to merit equity 
partnership without an accompanying successful effort in acquiring 
business. 
What does this portend for the anticipated next stage in 
transforming the profession from one grounded in a male model to one 
that encompasses the realities of women’s lives?  Can, in fact, the 
profession modify its demands of total commitment of hours devoted to 
creating billables and rainmaking in order to embrace the needs of 
women, many of whom wish to balance family demands with a realistic 
prospect of partnership, and to address the desires of those men and 
women who aspire to a quality of life that affords them more time, and 
still maintain law firms that are profitable?  The Glass Ceilings report 
indicates that the interest in alternative schedules among female and 
male associates who desire a better balance between personal and 
professional lives is “not merely idiosyncratic but bespeaks a pattern of 
changing value and expectations.”256  Yet, the young men and women 
who share such aspirations are presently not in a position to wield the 
power that would effectuate such change.  And at the same time the 
young associates express a desire for flexibility and accommodation to 
balance their lives, they “accept the idea that the demands of a harsh 
economic environment justify the pressures on them for long hours and 
client development after work.”257  Senior partners at law firms, the Glass 
Ceilings report demonstrates, while advocating the advancement of 
women, are at the same time committed to the established criteria for 
determining partnership.258  Senior women in law firms express the 
belief that the young attorneys do not seem to understand that law is 
                                                                                                             
there seems to be no lack of new talent ready and willing to accept what firms are 
offering.”  Id. 
256 Epstein, supra note 164, at 408. 
257 Id. at 441. 
258 Id. at 440. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 4 [2005], Art. 3
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol39/iss4/3
2005] Sex Discrimination 909 
simply a difficult and demanding profession.  And all who espouse such 
a transformation and advocate part-time, flex-time, mentoring, and 
variations in billing that depart from the billable hour standard, must 
address the practical and inevitable reality that the fixed overhead costs 
per lawyer remain substantial and that lawyers’ compensation and a law 
firm’s profit is premised on one essential: the fees they generate.  They 
further must acknowledge that it is not solely the male driven model 
which propels the legal profession to demand unfettered loyalty that is 
inconsistent with the needs of women and men who seek to balance 
private and professional lives.  It is also the impact of the intensely 
competitive atmosphere emanating from the increased numbers of 
attorneys which has contributed enormously to the changes witnessed in 
the profession, including: a demand for more billables, increased 
rainmaking, longer associateships, higher partner to associate ratios, and 
increasingly scrutinized standards for partnership.  Women have 
attained marked success in the law profession, penetrating barriers to 
participation in the nineteenth century and establishing a vital presence 
in nearly every indicia of achievement the profession reveres in 
contemporary society.  The effort to further expand the boundaries of 
women lawyers, to attain complete equity in terms of partnership, to 
shed remaining stereotypical gender perspectives on women’s ability 
and commitment, and to restructure the profession in order to achieve 
flexibility for both sexes are praiseworthy goals.  One must caution, 
however, that the reality of the depth of economic and competitive 
constraints within which the law profession operates, the burgeoning 
number of attorneys that only continues to escalate, further engendering 
a harsh, competitive atmosphere, and the entrenched posture of those 
empowered may pose formidable obstacles, at least in the near future, to 
the attainment of a genuine transformation of the profession. 
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